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Abstract 
 
This article argues that the rules of European private international law, which frame 
international litigation in the courts of the Member States of the EU, fail in their pursuit of the 
cosmopolitan goals of EU environmental policy.  The practical operation of these rules is 
limited to the following two types of case: 1) the case of victims suing an operator whose 
actions in one country directly cause environmental damage elsewhere, and 2) the case of 
victims suing a European-based multinational corporation operating in an extraction or 
chemical industry whose overseas subsidiary, typically in a developing country, causes 
environmental damage.  By arguably not accommodating claims by public authorities against 
foreign operators, including from other Member States, which are crucial in cases of pure 
environmental damage, and the cases of the second type in industries other than extraction and 
chemical, European private international law fails to achieve fully its regulatory potential.  
Furthermore, the rules of European private international law have the effect of raising the level 
of environmental protection solely within the EU and at its borders in the first type of case and 
shielding European multinational corporations from liability for the environmentally 
detrimental and degrading effects of their overseas operations in the second type of case.  
These rules are therefore an inadequate tool of global governance.  Avenues for improving the 
law are mentioned. 
Keywords: environment; litigation; European Union; private international law; conflict of 
laws; jurisdiction; choice of law 
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Introduction 
In the early 1990s the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People protested in Nigeria 
against the environmental damage allegedly caused by Royal Dutch Shell’s oil operations in 
Ogoniland, in the Niger Delta.  Several protesters were arrested by the Nigerian armed forces, 
charged with questionable crimes and executed.  Amongst them was Dr Barinem Kiobel, whose 
widow, after obtaining asylum in the United States, together with a number of other former 
Ogoniland residents, brought a class action suit under the 1789 Alien Tort Claims Act 
(‘ATCA’).1  The Act provides that ‘[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty 
of the United States’.  The claimants argued that the Anglo-Dutch corporation and its Nigerian 
subsidiary were complicit in the Nigerian government’s violations of the law of nations, 
including extrajudicial killing, torture, rape, arbitrary arrest and detention, theft and destruction 
of property. 
In April 2013, after a protracted legal battle, the US Supreme Court decided 
unanimously in favour of the defendants.2  The majority noted a strong presumption against 
the extraterritorial application of US law, and held that the Act did not cover overseas conduct 
of multinational corporations.  According to Roberts CJ, who delivered the opinion of the 
Court, the presumption will be displaced ‘where the claims touch and concern the territory of 
the United States…with sufficient force…  [I]t would reach too far to say that mere corporate 
presence suffices.’3  Alito J went further in his concurring opinion, in which Thomas J joined, 
by holding that an ATCA claim would fail, ‘unless the domestic conduct is sufficient to violate 
                                                 
1 28 U.S.C. §1350. 
2 Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 113 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
3 ibid 1669. 
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an international law norm that satisfies Sosa’s requirements of definitiveness and acceptance 
among civilised nations’,4 a very high threshold indeed.  Although the exact impact of Kiobel 
is unclear,5 it is evident that in the Supreme Court’s interpretation the Act has a very narrow 
reach. 
A reference to a US case concerning international human rights litigation may seem 
like a strange way to open an article dealing with international environmental litigation in the 
courts of the Member States of the European Union.  But Kiobel is an important piece of the 
context in which international environmental litigation now takes place in Europe.  It also 
illustrates two important characteristics of this type of litigation.  First, environmental litigation 
is often not just about who ultimately bears the risk of environmentally detrimental and 
degrading economic activities.  It is often also, sometimes primarily, about the victims’ human 
rights, usually the right to life, private and family life and home,6 health, property and the like, 
sometimes even about human rights not typically perceived as closely related to the protection 
of the environment (e.g. the right to a fair trial).  Second, international environmental litigation 
typically involves claimants from a developing country who suffer damage as a result of local 
activities of a multinational corporation and its local subsidiary.7  In the past few decades, 
                                                 
4 ibid 1670 (emphasis added).  Sosa is a reference to the US Supreme Court case of Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 524 
U.S. 692 (2004). 
5 The literature on Kiobel is immense.  See e.g. ‘Agora: Reflections on Kiobel’ (2013) 107 American Journal of 
International Law 829-863, contributions to symposiums ‘Human Rights Litigation in State Courts and Under 
State Law’, published in (2013) 3 UC Irvine Law Review 1-149 and ‘Extraterritoriality Post-Kiobel: International 
& Comparative Legal Perspectives’, published in (2013) 28 Maryland Journal of International Law 1-274, and 
the SCOTUS and Opinio Juris blogs: http://www.scotusblog.com/category/special-features/kiobel-symposium/; 
http://opiniojuris.org/page/3/?s=Kiobel+Insta-Symposium. 
6 See e.g. Lopez Ostra v Spain (1995) 20 EHRR 277; Guerra v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 357 (European Court of 
Human Rights). 
7 The term ‘multinational corporation’ is used in this article rather than ‘multinational enterprise’ or other similar 
terms to reflect the fact that it is incorporated business entities forming corporate groups based on parent-
subsidiary relations, not modern, open and flexible forms of corporate organisation or business networks, that 
typically appear as defendants in international environmental litigation.  For reasons see text to nn 71-76 below.  
For problems of definition see P. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford: OUP, 2nd ed, 2007) 
5-8. 
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numerous cases with these characteristics have been brought in US courts under the ATCA.8  
The Act has had a positive impact in the form of increased public awareness of the relevant 
issues, settlement of disputes and the resulting compensation of victims and even 
environmental remediation, and multinational corporations taking human rights and the 
protection of the environment more seriously.  Now that the US Supreme Court has interpreted 
very narrowly the Act’s reach, seemingly in effect barring victims of gross violations of human 
rights and the environment outside the US by multinational corporations from bringing ATCA 
claims, such victims will have to turn to other forums for the vindication of their rights.9  
European countries, where many multinational corporations originate, and particularly 
England, are promising alternative venues. 
This article explores whether and how the rules of private international law of EU law, 
which frame international litigation in the Member State courts, contribute to the regulation of 
the environment.  Looked at from another perspective, this article examines whether 
international environmental litigation in Europe, and thereby the relevant rules of European 
private international law, are an adequate tool of global governance.  Given the close 
connection between environmental and human rights litigation, the discussion in this article is 
also relevant for the debate concerning the role of international litigation for the protection of 
human rights. 
                                                 
8 The literature on environmental litigation under the ATCA is immense.  See e.g. N. Bridgeman, ‘Human Rights 
Litigation under the ATCA as a Proxy for Environmental Claims’ (2003) 6 Yale Human Rights and Development 
Law Journal 1; R.L. Herz, ‘Litigating Environmental Abuses under the Alien Tort Claims Act: A Practical 
Assessment’ (2000) 30 Virginia Journal of International Law 575; A. Rosenkranz and R. Campbell, ‘Foreign 
Environmental Harm and Human Rights Suits Against US Corporations in US Courts’ (1999) 18 Stanford 
Environmental Law Journal 145.  For ATCA claims in general see S. Joseph, Corporations and Transnational 
Human Rights Litigation (Oxford: Hart, 2004) Ch 2. 
9 J.A. Kirschner, ‘Why is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of Multinational Corporations to Europe: 
Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the Alien Tort Statute’ (2012) 30 Berkeley Journal of International Law 259; 
M.S. Quintanilla and C.A. Whytock, ‘The New Multipolarity in Transnational Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign 
Judgments, and Foreign Law’ (2011) 18 Southwestern Journal of International Law 31, 32-35 (presenting 
evidence that suggest that at the same time that US courts are decreasingly open to international litigation, the 
courts of other countries are increasingly attracting it). 
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In the EU, transnational environmental cases have been brought primarily in England, 
and to a significantly lesser extent in a few other Member States, most notably the Netherlands 
and Sweden.  Since many relevant issues have been discussed and decided by the English 
courts, this article will focus on international environmental litigation in this country.  There 
are two additional reasons for such focus.  First, the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in 
Chandler v Cape Plc,10 in which a duty of care was imposed on the defendant parent company 
for the health and safety of the employees of its dissolved subsidiary, might encourage overseas 
victims to bring claims in England against English-based multinational corporations for 
damage caused by their overseas subsidiaries to local workers and general population.  Second, 
the English legal system is said to offer claimants a number of procedural advantages, not all 
of which are available in other Member States: a system of conditional fees coupled with 
litigation insurance against the risk of having to pay the other party’s legal costs; efficient, 
skilled and impartial judges; availability of group actions; rules on disclosure and the 
preservation and taking of evidence; potentially high damages etc.11  A disproportionate 
number of transnational environmental cases is therefore likely to continue to be litigated in 
England in comparison with other Member States. 
The relevant rules of European private international law are contained in two EU law 
instruments.  The first is the Recast of the Brussels I Regulation,12 which replaced as of 10 
January 2015 the Brussels I Regulation.13  It allocates adjudicatory jurisdiction among the 
Member State courts and enables the free movement of judgments within Europe in civil and 
                                                 
10 [2012] EWCA Civ 525, [2012] 1 WLR 3111. 
11 T. Hartley, International Commercial Litigation: Text, Cases and Materials on Private International Law 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2009) 310. 
12 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) [2012] OJ 
L351/1 (‘Brussels I Recast’). 
13 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L16/1.  The rules of the Brussels I Regulation and the 
Brussels I Recast concerning the environment are largely identical. 
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commercial matters.  The second is the Rome II Regulation,14 which lays down choice-of-law 
rules for non-contractual obligations.  Rome II contains special rules for environmental damage 
in Article 7, which are largely inspired by the case law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (‘CJEU’) on jurisdiction for environmental torts under the Brussels jurisdictional 
regime.15  In a nutshell, the law applicable to environmental damage is by default the law of 
the country of the damage, but the person seeking compensation can choose the law of the 
country of the event giving rise to the damage.  Similarly, the claimant can commence 
proceedings, in addition to the Member State of the defendant’s domicile, in either the Member 
State of the damage or the Member State of the event. 
Recital 25 in the Preamble to Rome II states expressly that the special choice-of-law 
rules are justified by Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,16 
which concerns EU environmental policy.  These special choice-of-law rules also implement 
Article 3(3) and (5) of the Treaty on European Union,17 which sets the achievement of 
‘sustainable development’ and ‘a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of 
the environment’ as core objectives of the EU.  EU environmental policy includes the 
apparently cosmopolitan goals of ‘preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the 
environment, protecting human health, prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources, and 
promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental 
problems, and in particular combating climate change’.18  The term ‘cosmopolitan’ is used here 
to denote a normative standpoint that considers and accommodates the interests and values of 
individuals and communities not just within but also outside the EU.19  In the same vein, EU 
                                                 
14 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) [2007] OJ L199/40 (‘Rome II’). 
15 Case 21-76 Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v Mines de potasse d'Alsace SA [1976] ECR 1735 (‘Bier’). 
16 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (consolidated version) [2012] OJ C326/1 (‘TFEU’). 
17 Treaty on European Union (consolidated version) [2012] OJ C326/1. 
18 TFEU, Article 191(1). 
19 R. Wai, ‘Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private International Law 
in an Era of Globalization’ (2002) 40 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 209, 231-232. 
8 
 
environmental policy aims ‘at a high level of protection’ and is based on the following 
universally accepted principles of environmental law: ‘precautionary principle and...the 
principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a 
priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay’.20  Since many environmental 
problems are transnational, even global, in nature, it is logical that the relevant rules of 
European private international law, which may assist in their solution, should take a 
cosmopolitan approach.  Indeed, many influential private international law scholars are of the 
opinion that Article 7 of Rome II pursues, and in an adequate manner, the cosmopolitan goals 
of EU environmental policy.21  This rule has also been endorsed by the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law and the International Law Association.22 
Contrary to the majority opinion, this article argues that the relevant rules of European 
private international law fail to take a cosmopolitan approach.  They are therefore an inadequate 
                                                 
20 TFEU, Article 191(2). 
21 See G. Betlem and C. Bernasconi, ‘European Private International Law, the Environment and Obstacles for 
Public Authorities’ (2006) 122 Law Quarterly Review 124, 141 (‘the principle favouring the injured party (favor 
laesi) has thus a completely desirable and welcome corollary: favouring nature (favor naturae)’) and 142 (‘The 
effect of this rule is a general “levelling-up”...and can be seen as an application of the environmental integration 
principle in the field of private international law’ (footnote omitted)); O. Boskovic, ‘The Law Applicable to 
Violation of the Environment – Regulatory Strategies’ in F. Cafaggi and H. Muir Watt (eds), The Regulatory 
Function of European Private Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2009) 188, 196 (‘This option granted to the 
injured party seems satisfactory both in the light of the importance of the protection of the environment and of the 
extent of damage, even ordinary damage, resulting from its violations.’); L.F.H. Enneking, ‘The Common 
Denominator of the Trafigura Case, Foreign Direct Liability Cases and the Rome II Regulation’ (2008) 16 
European Review of Private Law 283, 310 (‘The Regulation’s specific rule on environmental damage is 
progressive and will have a limited conducive effect on the feasibility of regulating the transboundary activities 
of multinational corporations through tort law’) and 312 (‘the specific rule on environmental damage may prove 
to be the first step towards a more prominent role of tort law in deterring harmful activities of Europe-based 
multinational corporations in host countries’); H. Muir Watt, ‘Private International Law Beyond the Schism’ 
(2011) 2 Transnational Legal Theory 347, fn 377 (‘Article 7 integrates a private attorney general mechanism into 
the conflict of laws rule so as to ensure that private interest (in obtaining higher damages) coincides with the 
interests of the global commons (ensuring the highest available level of protection of the environment)’); J. von 
Hein, ‘Something Old and Something Borrowed, but Nothing New? Rome II and the European Choice-of-Law 
Evolution’ (2008) 82 Tulane Law Review 1663, 1703 (‘as the preference for a high level of environmental 
protection (expressed in Article 7)...show[s], the European legislature made judgments on the value of different 
rules and policies that may be characterized as liberal, progressive, and open-minded’). 
22 ‘Should the Hague Conference Revisit the Scope and Nature of Possible Work in the Field of Civil Liability for 
Environmental Damage?’ (Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference Preliminary Document No 12, February 
2010), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2010pd12e.pdf, [5]-[7]; International Law 
Association, ‘Transnational Enforcement of Environmental Law’ (Final Conference Resolution Toronto 2006), 
available at http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/794784AC-08FE-4DA9-A02948C51E5C4E0E, Rules 4 
and 5. 
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tool of global governance.  There is a strong argument that the Brussels I Recast and Rome II 
exclude from their scope claims by public authorities against foreign operators and the resulting 
judgments, thus potentially hindering an important type of international environmental 
litigation, which is crucial in cases of pure environmental damage, from taking place in Europe.  
The two Regulations address relatively adequately the type of case where the claim is brought 
by victims against an operator whose actions in one country directly cause environmental 
damage elsewhere.  But the cases of this type that are brought in EU courts will almost always 
concern actions committed in the EU and/or environmental damage suffered in the EU.  The 
rules of the Brussels I Recast and Rome II concerning this type of case therefore help to raise 
the level of environmental protection within the EU and at its borders, but not elsewhere.  
Crucially, it is argued that European private international law fails to deal with the globally 
more important and frequent cases of the same type as Kiobel.  It effectively shields European 
multinational corporations from liability for the environmentally detrimental and degrading 
effects of their overseas operations.  For these reasons, the relevant rules of European private 
international law overall fail in their pursuit of the cosmopolitan goals of EU environmental 
policy.  This conclusion raises the question how European private international law could more 
fully achieve its regulatory potential. 
This article is divided into seven sections.  Following this introduction, the second 
section outlines the regulatory potential of private international law with regard to the 
protection of the environment.  The third section divides the relevant CJEU and English and 
other domestic cases into different types.  It demonstrates that whatever regulatory potential 
European private international law may have, its practical operation is limited to only two types 
of case, namely the case of victims suing an operator whose actions in one country directly 
cause environmental damage elsewhere and the cases of the same type as Kiobel, but the latter 
only with regard to extraction and chemical industries.  The reasons for the relatively limited 
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practical operation of the relevant rules of European private international law are provided.  
The subsequent three sections explore how the rules of jurisdiction of the Brussels I Recast and 
the special choice-of-law rules for environmental damage of Rome II apply to the two types of 
case identified in the third section.  Shortcomings in the current rules are identified.  The 
seventh section concludes and examines the avenues for improvement. 
 
Private international law and the regulation of the environment 
It is nowadays widely understood that private law can be used as a regulatory tool that 
supplements or even replaces the ‘command and control’ and other types of regulation.  Private 
international law, a field of law of particular relevance for international environmental 
litigation, is no exception.23  This section presents the regulatory challenges posed by 
transnational environmental cases and various regulatory responses to them.24  The aim is to 
disclose the regulatory potential of private international law in this context. 
International environmental litigation concerns cases of environmental damage that are 
connected with more than one country.  In some cases, an operator’s actions in country A 
directly cause environmental damage in country B.  The main challenge in this type of case is 
that, since environmental standards25 of countries differ, the operator will be subject to the 
exclusive application of the laxer standards of country A, even if the negative externalities of 
                                                 
23 For the regulatory function of private international law see R. Michaels, ‘New European Choice-of-Law 
Revolution’ (2008) 82 Tulane Law Review 1607; H. Muir Watt, ‘Choice of Law in Integrated and Interconnected 
Markets: A Matter of Political Economy’ (2003) 9 Columbia Journal of European Law 383; H. Muir Watt, 
‘European Integration, Legal Diversity and the Conflict of Laws’ (2005) 9 Edinburgh Law Review 6; Muir Watt, 
above, n 21; Wai, above, n 19.  For the regulatory function of private law in general see C. Parker and others (eds), 
Regulating Law (Oxford: OUP, 2004). 
24 For environmental regulation in general see N. Gunningham and P. Grabosky with D. Sinclair, Smart 
Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998).  For the EU context see J. de Cendra de 
Larragán, ‘Regulatory Dilemmas in EC Environmental Law: The Ongoing Conflicts Between Competitiveness 
and the Environment’ in Cafaggi and Muir Watt (eds), above, n 21, 91. 
25 The term ‘environmental standards’ is used here in a broad sense and includes both ‘public law’ standards such 
as ‘command and control’ type of regulation and ‘private law’ standards of tort law. 
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its activities are suffered in country B.  In other cases, as illustrated by Kiobel, a parent company 
from country A has a subsidiary in country B that causes environmental damage in the latter 
country.  In this type of case, regulatory challenges are created by the fact that a multinational 
corporation, composed of the parent and its subsidiaries, operates its many parts in more than 
one country ‘with the coherence of intent and implementation that resembles a single entity’.26  
Of course, the constituent parts of a multinational corporation can be connected into a single 
economic entity not just through bonds of ownership but also through contractual relations or 
even informal alliances.27  The constituent parts, however, remain separate legal persons, 
falling under distinct and independent regulatory systems of the countries in which they are 
established and operate.  Consequently, each legal person forming part of a multinational 
corporation is accountable, in principle, only to its local authorities and liable only to its own 
creditors.  The main challenge in this type of case is that, through smart corporate organisation, 
the multinational corporation, as a single economic entity, may reap the profits generated by 
its constituent parts and simultaneously shift the risk of negative externalities of their activities 
on third parties by taking advantage of the constituent parts’ separate legal personality, their 
limited liability, the territorial jurisdiction of local authorities, and regulatory failures in host 
countries.  These failures consist in the inability or unwillingness of local authorities to regulate 
and oversee the multinational corporation’s local activities because of the host country’s socio-
economic underdevelopment, low administrative capacity and technical expertise, information 
asymmetry, fear of driving away foreign investors, corruption, collusion with the corporation 
and the like.28  These failures are often caused or exacerbated by a great disparity in economic 
                                                 
26 M. Anderson, ‘Transnational Corporations and Environmental Damage: Is Tort Law the Answer?’ (2002) 41 
Washburn Law Journal 399, 402. 
27 See G. Teubner, Networks as Connected Contracts (Oxford: Hart, 2011), edited with an introduction by H. 
Collins, in particular 133-139. 
28 J. Stiglitz, ‘Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of Cross-Border Legal Frameworks in 
a Globalized World Balancing Rights with Responsibilities’ (2008) 23 American University International Law 
Review 451, 474-481. 
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power between the multinational corporation and its home country, on the one hand, and the 
host country, on the other.29  Under-regulation may therefore occur in both types of case, 
leading to a globally suboptimal allocation of resources. 
In setting, monitoring and enforcing environmental standards, countries are typically 
guided by the interests and values of local individuals and communities, without considering 
and accommodating the interests and values of outsiders.  This results in two additional 
regulatory challenges.30  First, countries may turn the problem of under-regulation into an 
opportunity, and compete to attract foreign direct investment and try to increase the 
competitiveness of domestic businesses by lowering their environmental standards, especially 
when the negative externalities of local activities are suffered across the border.  This 
‘regulatory competition’ may, in turn, lead to a ‘race to the bottom’.  An extreme example of 
this is Papua New Guinea where lax environmental standards were coupled with legislation 
making it a criminal offence to sue multinational mining corporations operating and causing 
damage in that country.31  Yet another challenge is that countries typically regulate activities 
taking place in, or affecting, their territory without regard to the regulation in other countries.  
Consequently, operators may be subject to environmental standards of more than country, 
which may result in over-regulation.  Both scenarios lead to a globally inefficient resources 
allocation. 
These regulatory challenges would not exist if there were a global standard-setting, 
monitoring and enforcing authority or an effective global system of cooperation of national 
                                                 
29 ibid. 
30 Muchlinski, above, n 8, 114-117; Muir Watt, ‘Choice of Law in Integrated and Interconnected Markets’, above, 
n 23, 387-388, 399-401; Muir Watt, ‘European Integration, Legal Diversity and the Conflict of Laws’, above, n 
23, 17; A. Nicita and M.M. Winkler, ‘The Cost of Transnational Accidents: Lessons from Bhopal and Amoco’ 
(2009) 43 Journal of World Trade 683, 689-692; Wai, above, n 19, 250-258. 
31 A. Imhof, ‘The Big, Ugly Australian Goes to Ok Tedi’, (1996) 17(3) Multinational Monitor, available at 
http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm2002/02jan-feb/jan-feb02front.html (describing how corporations 
participated in the drafting of the Papua New Guinea legislation). 
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authorities with regard to the protection of the environment.  But there is no such authority or 
system.  Environmental treaties are patchy32 because of a genuine disagreement over the 
content and method of monitoring and enforcement of international environmental standards, 
and because of the free-riding by countries that see the advantage of not respecting such 
standards when other countries do.33  Furthermore, the existing treaties usually do not impose 
obligations directly upon multinational corporations and other operators.  Some scholars have 
advanced the idea that the home country of a multinational corporation should be responsible 
under international law, at least in some cases, for the environmental damage caused by the 
corporation’s constituent parts.34  This idea, however, remains purely theoretical.  There are 
many ‘soft law’ instruments regulating the activities of multinational corporations.  Particularly 
prominent are the following codes of conduct: the United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights,35 Global Compact,36 Agenda 21,37 the International Labour 
Organisation Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy,38 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises,39 and the ISO 26000 Guidance Standard on Social Responsibility.40  
In addition, there is consumer pressure through eco-labelling, investor pressure through 
                                                 
32 C. Bernasconi, ‘Civil Liability Resulting from Transfrontier Environmental Damage: A Case for the Hague 
Conference’ (Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law Preliminary Document 
No 8, April 2000), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gen_pd8e.pdf, 4-15 (concluding that ‘a 
worldwide private international law Convention would come to fill a yawning gap’).  See International Law 
Commission, Survey of Liability Regimes Relevant to the Topic of International Liability for Injurious 
Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law (International Liability in Case of Loss 
from Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities) (UN Doc A/CN.4/543, 24 June 2004), available 
at http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_543.pdf. 
33 Wai, above, n 19, 250-252.  See also N. Sachs, ‘Beyond the Liability Wall: Strengthening Tort Remedies in 
International Environmental Law’ (2008) 55 UCLA Law Review 837 (identifying three roadblocks for the 
conclusion of environmental civil liability treaties: interest conflicts between developed and developing countries; 
high transaction costs and low expected payoffs; incorporation of treaty provisions that are too onerous for 
countries to accept). 
34 For an overview see E. Morgera, Corporate Accountability in International Environmental Law (Oxford: OUP, 
2009) 34-38. 
35 http://business-humanrights.org/en/un-guiding-principles. 
36 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/. 
37 http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=52&ArticleID=49. 
38 http://www.ilo.org/empent/Publications/WCMS_094386/lang--en/index.htm. 
39 http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/. 
40 http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso26000.htm. 
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environment-friendly investment practices, general public and civil society pressure, and 
corporate self-regulation.  But since these regulatory responses typically do not result in the 
imposition of legal obligations on multinational corporations and other operators, their 
regulatory potential is limited. 
Another response to the regulatory challenges posed by transnational environmental 
cases lies in international environmental litigation.  In purely domestic settings, tort law is used 
as a regulatory tool for the protection of the environment, usually as a supplement to ‘command 
and control’ and other types of regulation.41  It pursues the objective of compensating victims 
of environmental damage for the harm they suffer as a consequence of the tortfeasor’s actions, 
possibly also making funds available for environmental remediation, in particular if 
environmental NGOs are given standing to commence environmental litigation.  The 
compensatory function of tort law is usually supported by liability insurance or environmental 
damage insurance.  Furthermore, by forcing actual or potential tortfeasors to internalise the 
negative externalities of their activities, tort law also performs a specific and general deterring 
function.  The tortfeasor is in a better position to bear the risk of its activities than those who 
are affected by them.  For instance, it can improve its environmental performance by investing 
in its technologies and practices and take out insurance.  On the other hand, it is highly unlikely 
that many victims of the tortfeasor’s activities will have known of, insured themselves against 
or in other way managed the risk of those activities.  By shifting the risk to the best cost-
avoider, tort law contributes to the achievement of the optimal allocation of resources.  Where 
                                                 
41 K. Abraham, ‘The Relation Between Civil Liability and Environmental Regulation: An Analytical Overview’ 
(2002) 41 Washburn Law Journal 379; Anderson, above, n 26, 408-409; M.G. Faure, ‘Regulatory Strategies in 
Environmental Liability’ in Cafaggi and Muir Watt (eds), above, n 21, 129; Gunningham and Grabosky, above, 
n 24, 78-79, 86-87; D. Howarth, ‘Muddying the Waters: Tort Law and the Environment from an English 
Perspective’ (2002) 41 Washburn Law Journal 469; K.N. Hylton, ‘When Should We Prefer Tort Law to 
Environmental Regulation?’ (2002) 41 Washburn Law Journal 515.  For a critical account of the regulatory 
function of tort law see P. Cane, ‘Tort Law as Regulation’ (2002) 31 Common Law World Review 305; P. Cane, 
‘Using Tort Law to Enforce Environmental Regulations?’ (2002) 41 Washburn Law Journal 427; J. Stapleton, 
‘Regulating Torts’ in C. Parker and other (eds), above, n 23, 122. 
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environmental damage is caused by a member of a corporate group, the fulfilment of tort law’s 
regulatory function also depends on whether, and to what extent, company law ascribes liability 
to the parent company for the environmental damage caused by its subsidiary.  In transnational 
cases, the applicable tort law and company law depend on the applicable choice-of-law rules, 
which, in turn, depend on where the litigation takes place.  By allowing the victim to commence 
proceedings in a certain jurisdiction and by leading to the application of a certain law, private 
international law also performs compensatory and deterring functions.  International 
environmental litigation has other characteristics which support its regulatory function: it 
generates pressure on private actors and governments; it constitutes, sustains and energises 
transnational networks of civil society; it provides information and policy opinions to interested 
parties, transnational networks and broader publics; it encourages settlement.42  The fact that 
international environmental litigation relies on private parties to bring claims with a regulatory 
impact contributes to the effectiveness of this regulatory response.  In some countries, 
conditional or contingent fees are available.  There, the victim may be able to obtain the 
services of top litigation lawyers who will also have an interest in the outcome of the litigation. 
International environmental litigation, however, comes with a number of 
disadvantages.  It can be slow, expensive, and operates on an ex post and case-by-case, and 
therefore selective and unsystematic, basis.  There may be factual and legal problems arising 
out of the long latency of harm, the indeterminate nature of claimants and defendants, and the 
intersection of public law and civil liability.43  In criticising the use of tort law as a regulatory 
tool, Cane notes that courts are neither expert in relevant areas of regulated activity nor 
politically responsive, that they rely more or less exclusively on litigants for information about 
                                                 
42 R. Wai, ‘Transnational Private Litigation and Transnational Governance’ in M. Lederer and P.S. Mueller (eds), 
Criticising Global Governance (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 243, 248-250. 
43 Abraham, above, n 41, 380-383. See also C. van Dam, ‘Tort Law and Human Rights: Brothers in Arms. On the 
Role of Tort Law in the Area of Business and Human Rights’ (2011) Journal of European Tort Law 221, 228-
229 (‘Perhaps the most fundamental problem…is fact-finding’) 
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regulated activities, and that court procedures in tort cases largely exclude participation of third 
parties who might be affected by the regulated activity.44  In addition, tort litigation sometimes 
exhibits the following negative features: ‘inexperienced and under-funded lawyers 
representing poor and vulnerable clients against wealthy and aggressively defensive 
corporations; the difficulty courts have in dealing with scientific uncertainty; and the negative 
effects of delay and inequality of bargaining power on settlement negotiations’.45  Some of 
these disadvantages can be mitigated to a large extent by improving civil procedure rules or 
introducing specialised environmental courts and tribunals.46  On the other hand, political 
irresponsiveness of the judiciary, seen by Cane as a disadvantage in purely domestic settings, 
can actually represent an advantage in transnational environmental cases.  In cases like Kiobel, 
for example, overseas victims of the activities of a multinational corporation resort to litigation 
in the home country of the multinational’s parent company because they are unable to obtain 
justice in their own country.  Since such victims are outsiders in the forum country, their 
interests will be unrepresented in the legislative and administrative bodies of that country.  
International environmental litigation, however, provides for a more open and effective point 
of access for such victims.47  Since judges are independent of the directly accountable 
legislatures and executives and hold permanent positions, they are less likely to succumb to the 
pressure to resolve transnational environmental cases exclusively in the interest of local 
individuals and communities. 
Given the lack of comprehensive and effective international environmental standards 
and a global system of cooperation, and the limitations of alternative regulatory responses, 
                                                 
44 Cane, ‘Tort Law as Regulation’, above, n 41, 313. 
45 ibid 322-323. 
46 G.R. Pring and C.K. Pring, ‘The Future of Environmental Dispute Resolution’ (2012) 40 Denver Journal of 
International Law & Policy 482 (examining the major problems with courts of general jurisdiction and the key 
characteristics of specialised environmental courts and tribunals). 
47 R. Michaels, ‘Global Problems in Domestic Courts’ in S. Muller and others (eds), The Law of the Future and 
the Future of the Law (FICHL Publication Series No 11, 2011) 165, 174-175; Wai, above, n 42, 251-252. 
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international environmental litigation is a promising way of addressing the regulatory 
challenges posed by transnational environmental cases despite all its disadvantages.48  In order 
to achieve fully its regulatory potential, private international law should lead to outcomes that 
avoid both under- and over-regulation.  Private international law can attain this goal only if the 
rules of adjudicatory jurisdiction and choice of law result in a coordinated allocation of 
adjudicatory and regulatory authority.49  Such coordination inevitably requires the rules of 
private international law to take a cosmopolitan approach.  But a crucial question then arises.  
If comprehensive and effective international environmental standards and a global system of 
cooperation cannot be achieved because countries are typically guided by the interests and 
values of local individuals and communities, why would any country adopt private 
international law rules that take into account and accommodate the interests and values of 
outsiders? 
The rules of private international law concerning the environment in general, and 
particularly those of EU law, should take a cosmopolitan approach for the following reasons.  
Since environmental problems are transnational, even global, in nature, they require 
cosmopolitan solutions.50  The fact that truly global solutions are precluded because of genuine 
disagreement among countries and the problem of free-riding shows that the objective of 
environmental protection can more adequately be pursued at a sub-global level, for example 
through rules of private international law in conjunction with the applicable tort and company 
laws.  The EU is particularly well suited for providing cosmopolitan private international law 
rules.51  The EU pursues objectives that transcend the interests and values of individual 
                                                 
48 Also Muir Watt, ‘Choice of Law in Integrated and Interconnected Markets’, above, n 23, 388-389; O. Perez, 
Ecological Sensitivity and Global Legal Pluralism: Rethinking the Trade and Environment Conflict (Oxford: Hart, 
2004) 191-192; Wai ibid 245. 
49 Muir Watt ibid 386-389, 399-408; Wai, above, n 19, 253-254.  See also A.T. Guzman, ‘Choice of Law: New 
Foundations’ (2002) 90 Georgetown Law Journal 883. 
50 Michaels, above, n 47, 165; Muir Watt ibid 402-404. 
51 See J. Bomhoff, ‘The Constitution of the Conflict of Laws’ (LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
4/2014), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2014-04_Bomhoff.pdf, 17-18 (emphasising 
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Member States and, furthermore, prides itself with the highest standards in many policy areas.  
It is therefore not surprising that EU environmental policy expressly pursues cosmopolitan 
goals.52  Europe is a home to many multinational corporations and other operators engaged in 
environmentally detrimental and degrading activities.  The EU therefore has the power to affect 
the way such activities are conducted and thereby neutralise the effects of the measures adopted 
by host countries that lead to a ‘race to the bottom’, thus raising the global level of 
environmental protection.  As a beneficiary of such activities, the EU should be responsible for 
their regulation, especially where there are regulatory failures in host countries.53  This is 
indeed demanded by many EU citizens, who act as consumers and small investors.  Requiring 
multinational corporations established in the EU to respect high environmental standards also 
makes long-term economic sense.54  For example, in order to reduce their compliance costs, 
those corporations will have to invest in research and development.  Since there is a global 
trend of raising environmental standards, such investment may pay off in the long term.  Those 
corporations may be able to export advanced environmental technologies and practices, on the 
one hand, and enjoy greater productivity levels in comparison with their foreign competitors, 
on the other.55  The argument that home state regulation represents an imperialist infringement 
                                                 
the constitutional function of private international law ‘in the allocation of regulatory authority and responsibility, 
and the formation of political and cultural identity’ which reinforces this field of law ‘as a site of contestation and 
deliberation over questions of authority, responsibility and identity’). 
52 TFEU, Article 191. 
53 P.I. Blumberg, ‘Accountability of Multinational Corporations: The Barriers Presented by Concepts of the 
Corporate Juridical Entity’ (2001) 24 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 297; O. De Schutter, 
‘The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in European Law’ (Center for Human Rights 
and Global Justice, New York University School of Law, Working paper No. 1, 2004), available at 
http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/s04deschutter.pdf; Morgera, above, n 34,  30-31; Muchlinski, above, 
n 7, 84; Muir Watt, above, n 21, 386, 425-427. 
54 This idea is behind the concept of corporate social responsibility, as advocated by the European Commission: 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 25 October 2011, COM(2011) 681 final, 3. 
55 Gunningham and Grabosky mention in Smart Regulation, above, n 24, at p 43, Germany as an example of a 
country where high environmental standards have been credited with not only improving the productivity of 
existing firms through technological and managerial improvements, but also the creation of entire new pollution 
control industries.  These firms are in a competitive position to export their products and services as others catch 
up. 
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of the sovereignty of disempowered host states is not persuasive where the interests at stake, 
i.e. the protection of the environment, are truly global.56 
If its rules do take a cosmopolitan approach, private international law will have gone a 
long way towards adopting a ‘planetary perspective’57 and fulfilling its ‘social mission’.58  The 
examination of whether, and to what extent, European private international law achieves its 
regulatory potential starts with the exploration of the types of transnational environmental cases 
it is able to accommodate. 
 
Types of transnational environmental cases and international environmental litigation 
in EU courts 
International environmental litigation is not a new phenomenon in Europe.  Two relevant cases 
have thus far been decided by the CJEU.  The English courts have been particularly busy with 
this kind of litigation.  Very important cases have recently been brought in the Dutch and 
Swedish courts.  By focusing on the two CJEU cases and the experience of the English, Dutch 
and Swedish courts in the past two decades, this section aims to identify the types of 
transnational environmental case that are litigated in Europe, and to explain why some types 
of case do not appear in EU courts. 
 
(1) Types of case litigated in EU courts 
                                                 
56 See S.L. Seck, ‘Home State Regulation of Environmental Human Rights Harms as Transnational Private 
Regulatory Governance’ (2013) 13 German Law Journal 1364. 
57 Muir Watt, above, n 21. 
58 U. Baxi, ‘Mass Torts, Multinational Enterprise Liability and Private International Law’ (1999) 276 Recueil des 
Cours 305. 
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The two cases decided by the CJEU are Bier59 and Land Oberösterreich v ČEZ.60  In Bier, a 
Dutch horticulturalist and the Reinwater Foundation, a non-governmental environmental 
organisation that aims to improve the quality of the water in the Rhine basin, brought an action 
in the Netherlands against a French potash mining company.  The defendant had polluted the 
waters of the Rhine by discharging in it saline waste from its operations.  The first claimant 
suffered damage as a result of using the polluted water for irrigation.  The issue before the 
Court was whether the Dutch courts had jurisdiction under the Brussels Convention,61 the 
predecessor of the Brussels I Regulation and the Brussels I Recast.  In Land Oberösterreich v 
ČEZ, Land Oberösterreich, an Austrian local authority, and some private persons commenced 
proceedings in nuisance against ČEZ, a Czech public utility company, seeking injunctive relief.  
The defendant operates a nuclear power plant in Temelin, a place in the Czech Republic near 
the Austrian border.  The claimants alleged that the power plant emitted ionising radiation, 
which affected their agricultural land located in Austria.  The issue was whether EU law obliged 
the claimants to tolerate the activities of the defendant which had been authorised by the Czech 
authorities in the situation where an equivalent authorisation by the Austrian authorities to an 
operator of a nuclear power plant in Austria would have precluded claims for injunctive relief. 
Cases of international environmental litigation in the English courts are fairly 
numerous.  They concerned the pollution of water, land and air, and typically personal injury, 
property damage and economic loss caused by such pollution.  The best known are the two 
cases that reached the House of Lords: Lubbe v Cape62 and Connelly v RTZ.63  In Lubbe v Cape, 
several thousand claimants either worked at or lived close to asbestos mines and processing 
                                                 
59 [1976] ECR 1735. 
60 Case C-115/08 Land Oberösterreich v ČEZ as. [2009] ECR I-10265. 
61 Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters done at Brussels 
on 27 September 1968 [1972] OJ L299/32. 
62 Lubbe v Cape Plc [2000] 1 WLR 1545. 
63 Connelly v RTZ Corp Plc (No 2) [1998] AC 854. 
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plants situated in South Africa, which were owned by local subsidiaries of an English-based 
corporation.  The claimants commenced proceedings in England against the parent company 
arguing that they had contracted asbestiosis as a result of the defendant’s negligence to protect 
them from the exposure to asbestos.  In addition, claims were brought by four Italian claimants 
for the harm suffered while working at or living close to a factory owned by an Italian 
subsidiary of the English-based corporation.  The second case concerned a claim brought by 
Mr Connelly, a Scotsman.  He worked for four years in Namibia at a uranium mine owned by 
a local subsidiary of an English-based corporation.  After returning to Scotland, he was 
diagnosed with suffering from cancer of the throat.  He then commenced proceedings in 
England against the parent company and one of its English subsidiaries claiming damages in 
negligence for the defendants’ failure to protect him from the effect of uranium ore dust on the 
mining site.  The issue in both cases was whether the English proceedings should be stayed on 
the basis of the forum non conveniens doctrine in the situation where adequate legal 
representation was unavailable in the natural forum because of the lack of legal aid and 
adequate conditional fee arrangements. 
The vast majority of other cases brought in England follow the same pattern.64  An 
English-based corporation operating in an extraction or chemical industry carries on its 
activities abroad, typically in a developing country, though a local subsidiary.  The workers of 
                                                 
64 Ngcobo v Thor Chemicals Holdings Ltd [1995] TLR 579 (CA); Sithole v Thor Chemicals Holdings Ltd [1999] 
TLR 110 (CA) (claims by workers of the defendant’s South African subsidiary engaged in the production of 
mercury-based chemicals); Durham v T&N Plc, Court of Appeal, 01 May 1996, unreported (claim by a worker of 
the defendant’s Canadian subsidiary engaged in asbestos mining); Guerrero v Monterrico Metals Plc [2009] 
EWHC 2475 (QB) and [2010] EWHC 3228 (QB) (claims by Peruvian environmental protesters for false 
imprisonment, torture and mistreatment by the police at a copper mine owned by the defendant’s local subsidiary); 
the Ocensa Pipeline litigation (claims by Columbian farmers against British Petroleum for damage to their land, 
crops and animals caused by the construction of an oil pipeline in Columbia): Arroyo v Equion Energia Ltd 
(Formerly BP Exploration Co (Colombia) Ltd) [2013] EWHC 3150 (TCC) and [2013] EWHC 3173 (TCC) and 
an unreported judgment from 6 May 2010, Case No HQ08X00328; Bodo Community v Shell (claims by Nigerian 
fishermen for damage caused by oil spills from Shell’s Trans-Niger Pipeline): 
http://www.leighday.co.uk/News/2012/March-2012/11,000-Nigerians-sue-Shell-in-London-Courts and 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jan/07/shell-announces-55m-payout-for-nigeria-oil-spills; Vava 
v Anglo American South Africa Ltd [2013] EWHC 2131 (QB), [2013] Bus LR D65 (silicosis clams against the 
defendant’s South African subsidiary engaged in gold mining). 
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the subsidiary or people living in the area of its operations suffer personal injury, property 
damage or economic loss as a result of the exposure to a dangerous substance through the 
medium of water, land or air.  One case involved the persecution of environmental protesters.  
Victims typically face a number of obstacles to commence proceedings in their own country: 
inability to obtain adequate representation because of the lack of funding or local firms that 
can handle complex cases; inefficient and inexperienced judges and procedures; corruption; 
collusion with the multinational corporation; lower damages; withdrawal of the multinational 
corporation from the host country etc.  For these reasons, victims commence proceedings 
against the parent company in the English courts.  This pattern is confirmed by a recent case 
brought in the Dutch courts65 and is also visible in ATCA litigations in the US courts, as 
exemplified by Kiobel.  Two cases that do not entirely fit this pattern are Trafigura66 and the 
Swedish case Arica Victims KB v Boliden Mineral AB.67  Trafigura is a Dutch incorporated oil 
trading company, with its operations base in London.  In 2006 it chartered a ship which illegally 
fly-tipped toxic waste at locations around Abidjan in Ivory Coast, after permission to offload 
the waste had been denied in several other countries.  Some 30,000 claimants commenced a 
group action against Trafigura in England.  A criminal trial was also conducted in the 
Netherlands and France.  Boden Mineral AB is one of the largest Swedish mining companies, 
which during 1984–1985 exported some highly toxic mining waste (sludge) from Sweden to 
an area known as Polygono in Arica, Chile.  The claim was brought by Arica Victims KB, an 
association representing a number of people from this area who suffered from serious illnesses 
                                                 
65 In Akpan and others v Royal Dutch Shell and Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd (2013) 
LJN BY9854 (Netherlands), Friends of the Earth Netherlands (Milieudefensie) have, together with a number of 
Nigerian farmers and fishermen, commenced proceedings against Royal Dutch Shell and its Nigerian subsidiary 
for environmental damage caused in Nigeria: C. Ryngaert, ‘Tort Litigation in Respect of Overseas Violations of 
Environmental Law Committed by Corporations: Lessons from the Akpan v Shell Litigation in the Netherlands’ 
(2013) 8 McGill International Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy 245. 
66 The case was settled before trial.  See ‘How the Trafigura Story unfolded’, The Guardian, 13 October 2009.  
See also Motto v Trafigura Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1150, [2012] 1 WLR 657 (on costs). 
67 (2013) T. 1021–13: R.K. Larsen, ‘Foreign Direct Liability Claims in Sweden: Learning from Arica Victims KB 
v Boliden Mineral AB?’ (2014) 83 Nordic Journal of International Law 404. 
23 
 
related to excessive levels of, among other, arsenic in their blood. These two cases are unusual 
in that no overseas subsidiaries were involved in the poisoning of the claimants, although the 
defendants in both cases argued that the waste had been dumped by local independent 
contractors, which had been appointed in good faith.  Interestingly, claimants in all the English 
cases, as well as in Chandler v Cape,68 were represented by the same firm of London lawyers, 
Leigh Day.69 
Cases of international environmental litigation can be divided into several types by 
using the following criteria: the (de)localised nature of the actual or potential tort; the 
defendant’s corporate organisation; the defendant’s industry; the nature of the claimant (see 
table 1).  Sometimes, as in Bier and Land Oberösterreich v ČEZ, the tort is delocalised, in the 
sense that the defendant’s actions and/or damage are not confined to one country.  But, as the 
English, Dutch and Swedish experience shows, cases where the elements of the tort are 
localised, i.e. confined to one country only, are more common.  Depending on the defendant’s 
corporate organisation, cases of international environmental litigation also fall into two types.  
In some cases, it is the defendant’s acts or omissions that directly cause the damage, as in Bier 
and Land Oberösterreich v ČEZ.  In others, a foreign subsidiary of the defendant is also 
involved.  Since the foreign subsidiary often lacks funds or even ceases to exist before the claim 
is brought, claimants typically look for ways to ascribe liability to the parent company for the 
actions of the subsidiary.  An option is to rely on the ‘piercing of the corporate veil’, ‘enterprise 
liability’, agency and related doctrines.  Another option, regularly pursued in the English and 
recently in the Dutch and Swedish courts, is to argue that the defendant has breached a duty of 
care that it owes directly to the victims.  Such cases are frequently referred to as ‘foreign direct 
                                                 
68 [2012] EWCA Civ 525, [2012] 1 WLR 3111. 
69 http://www.leighday.co.uk/Illness-and-injury/International-and-group-claims. 
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liability’ cases.70  Most cases concern extraction industries.  The minority of cases concern 
other industries such as the production of chemicals (Thor Chemicals), the production and 
distribution of nuclear energy (Land Oberösterreich v ČEZ) and oil trading (Trafigura).  
Finally, cases can in theory be divided into those where the claim is pursued by a private party 
or a public authority.  However, all of the mentioned cases involved private claimants.  Even 
in Land Oberösterreich v ČEZ, the claimant, an Austrian local authority, acted in a private 
capacity as a landowner.  The majority of claimants were victims of environmental damage.  A 
non-governmental environmental organisation appeared as claimant in Bier, in the Dutch case 
of Akpan v Shell and in the Swedish case of Arica Victims KB v Boliden Mineral AB. 
  
                                                 
70 L.F.H. Enneking, Foreign Direct Liability and Beyond – Exploring the Role of Tort Law in Promoting 
International Corporate Social Responsibility and Accountability (The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 
2012); Morgera, above, n 34, 31; H. Ward, ‘Governing Multinationals: The Role of Foreign Direct Liability’ (The 
Royal Institute for International Affairs, Briefing Paper, New Series No. 18 February 2001), available at 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20and%20Develop
ment/roleoffdl.pdf. 
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Table 1: classification of transnational environmental cases litigated in EU courts 
Case 
Nature of the 
tort 
Defendant’s 
corporate 
organisation 
Defendant’s 
industry 
Nature of the 
claimant 
Bier (CJEU, the 
Netherlands) 
Delocalised No subsidiary Potash mining Private 
Land 
Oberösterreich 
v ČEZ (CJEU, 
Austria) 
Delocalised No subsidiary 
Nuclear energy 
production and 
distribution 
Private 
Lubbe v Cape 
(England) 
Localised 
Involvement of 
a subsidiary 
Asbestos 
mining 
Private 
Connelly v RTZ 
(England) 
Localised 
Involvement of 
a subsidiary 
Asbestos 
mining 
Private 
Thor Chemicals 
(England) 
Localised 
Involvement of 
a subsidiary 
Production of 
mercury-based 
chemicals 
Private 
Durham v T&N 
Plc (England) 
Localised 
Involvement of 
a subsidiary 
Asbestos 
mining 
Private 
Guerrero v 
Monterrico 
Metals Plc 
(England) 
Localised 
Involvement of 
a subsidiary 
Copper mining Private 
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Ocensa Pipeline 
litigation 
(England) 
Localised 
Involvement of 
a subsidiary 
Oil exploration 
and exploitation 
Private 
Bodo 
Community v 
Shell (England) 
Localised 
Involvement of 
a subsidiary 
Oil exploration 
and exploitation 
Private 
Vava v Anglo 
American South 
Africa Ltd 
(England) 
Localised 
Involvement of 
a subsidiary 
Gold mining Private 
Akpan v Shell 
(the 
Netherlands) 
Localised 
Involvement of 
a subsidiary 
Oil exploration 
and exploitation 
Private 
Trafigura (civil 
proceedings in 
England; 
criminal trial in 
the Netherlands 
and France) 
Localised 
No subsidiary; 
use of 
independent 
contractor 
Oil trading Private 
Arica Victims 
KB v Boliden 
Mineral AB 
(Sweden) 
Localised 
No subsidiary; 
use of 
independent 
contractor 
Copper, zinc, 
lead, gold and 
silver mining 
Private 
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(2) Why some types of case are not litigated in EU courts 
The classification in Table 1 reveals two intriguing facts.  First, all cases where a defendant’s 
foreign subsidiary was involved concerned only extraction and chemical industries.  Although 
transnational corporate groups also exist in other industries that have the potential to harm the 
environment, such as clothing, manufacturing and IT, no claims have thus far been brought 
against parents companies in such corporate groups.  Second, all cases involved private 
claimants.  Why has international environmental litigation against the parents of corporate 
groups involved only extraction and chemical industries?  Why have transnational 
environmental cases not been brought by public authorities?  Is international environmental 
litigation, for whatever reason, unsuitable for these types of case?  If so, the regulatory potential 
of European private international law is significantly curtailed.  The following text aims to 
answer these questions. 
With regard to the first question, an explanation lies in the fact that extraction and 
chemical industries are by their characteristics and location more likely to encounter 
environmental and human rights related problems.  Furthermore, as Muchlinski observes,71 the 
corporate organisation of Cape (but also of the defendants in other cases of the same type) was 
‘that of a hierarchical parent-subsidiary group, typical of early [multinational enterprises] 
operating in high-risk, capital-intensive extraction industries where economies of scale are 
important.’  These defendants ‘appear to fit into the theoretical model of the closely controlled, 
managerially centralised, MNE’.72  Modern forms of business organisation, however, involve 
subsidiaries or affiliates with substantially more autonomy.  The bonds of ownership are often 
replaced by purely contractual relations or even informal alliances.73  Modern forms of 
                                                 
71 P. Muchlinski, ‘Holding Multinationals to Account: Recent Developments in English Litigation and the 
Company Law Review’ (2002) 23 The Company Lawyer 168, 170. 
72 ibid. 
73 Teubner, above, n 27. 
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corporate organisation and business networks relate primarily to newer high technology 
industries such as information technology or advanced product manufacture.74  Given the 
looser connections between the members of modern forms of corporate organisation and 
business networks, it is considerably more difficult to pierce the corporate veil or establish a 
direct duty of care on the part of the parent company in such an organisation or of the 
controlling enterprise(s), if any, in a network.75  Since the odds of winning the case are 
correspondingly reduced, the possibility for the workers of subsidiaries in such an organisation 
or of cooperating enterprises in a network and for the affected members of the general public 
of finding a law firm to represent them a ‘no win no fee’ basis is very remote.76 
Looking at the cases from the past two decades, it is surprising that no international 
environmental litigation in Europe has been brought by a public authority.77  After all, some 
transnational environmental cases concern pure environmental damage where no individual 
suffers actionable personal injury, property damage or economic loss or where such harm is 
thinly spread among a number of victims.  In such cases, it is usually up to public authorities 
to seek injunctive relief or clean up the pollution and seek recovery of the clean-up costs from 
the operator.  Indeed, the most important piece of EU environmental legislation, the 
                                                 
74 Muchlinski, above, n 71, 171.  See ‘Partners in Wealth’, part of the special report on ‘The New Organisation’, 
The Economist, 21 January 2006: ‘companies today cohabit with a vast number of joint-ventures and strategic 
alliances, some more and some less connected.  The line between what is inside and what is outside the 
corporation, once so clear, has become blurred...  Firms such as Nike have stretched this idea to such an extent 
that some of them now make nothing: all Nike's shoes, for instance, are manufactured by subcontractors’). 
75 See Muchlinski, above, n 7, 316-317. 
76 According to Richard Meeran, a partner in Leigh Day: ‘In considering the potential for legal action in MNC 
home courts, the relevance of financial resources, constraints and incentives for claimants’ lawyers cannot be 
overstated.  The fact of the matter is that, apart from a few exceptions, claimants’ lawyers in MNC home states 
have shown a distinct lack of enthusiasm for undertaking such cases.’: R. Meeran, ‘Tort Litigation against 
Multinationals (“MNCs”) for Violation of Human Rights: an Overview of the Position outside the US’ (March 
2011), available at http://www.businesshumanrights.org/media/documents/richard-meeran-tort-litigation-
against-mncs-7-mar-2011.pdf. 
77 Compare In Re Amoco Cadiz, No 78 M.D.L. 376, 1984 AMC 2123 (N.D. III. 1984), a case concerning an oil 
spill off the French coast, where France and various municipalities claimed pollution damages and clean-up costs 
in the US courts: see N. Eskenazi, ‘Forum non Conveniens and Choice of Law in Re Amoco Cadiz’ (1993) 24 
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 371. 
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Environmental Liability Directive,78 is concerned only with claims by public authorities against 
operators for the enforcement of environmental standards and recovery of clean-up costs.  
Although the Directive acknowledges potential actions by public authorities against foreign 
operators,79 it does not provide for any special procedures for the bringing of such actions.  One 
would therefore expect to find cases under the Brussels regime of public authorities from one 
Member State initiating proceedings abroad against foreign operators or of public authorities 
from one Member State seeking enforcement abroad of judgments rendered under the 
Directive. 
A reason for the lack of such cases may lie in the fact that there is a strong argument 
that claims by public authorities under the Environmental Liability Directive concern public 
law in the sense defined by the CJEU for the purposes of the Brussels regime.  Given that the 
Brussels regime applies only to ‘civil and commercial matters’,80 claims brought by public 
authorities abroad and judgments rendered under the Directive arguably fall outside its scope.  
A leading case on the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ is Rüffer.81  This case 
concerned a claim by the Netherlands for the recovery of the costs involved in the removal of 
a wreck in a public waterway over which the Netherlands exercised river-police functions 
under a Dutch-German treaty.  The CJEU held that the claim did not arise in a civil or 
commercial matter, since the treaty conferred on the claimant the status of a public authority 
and the claimant exercised its public authority powers in removing the wreck.82  By analogy, 
it is arguable that the Directive confers on the competent authorities of Member States public 
authority powers which they exercise when enforcing environmental standards and claiming 
                                                 
78 Directive 2004/35/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability 
with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage [2004] OJ L143/56. 
79 ibid Article 15(3). 
80 Brussels I Recast, Article 1(1); Brussels I, Article 1(1); Brussels Convention, Article 1(1). 
81 Case 814/79 Netherlands State v Reinhold Rüffer [1980] ECR 3807. 
82 ibid [7]-[15]. 
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clean-up costs against operators.  If so, it would not mean that international environmental 
litigation by public authorities is completely precluded.  It would mean that this type of 
litigation has to take place under the Member States’ traditional rules of jurisdiction and 
recognition and enforcement or foreign judgments and, if any, environmental treaties.  Given 
that the Member States’ traditional laws also contain public law exceptions83 and the dearth of 
civil liability environmental treaties,84 the prospect of international environmental litigation by 
public authorities in Europe is poor. 
Admittedly, it is not certain that claims by public authorities under the Environmental 
Liability Directive concern public law.  According to some scholars, these claims arise in a 
civil or commercial matter,85 and thus fall under the scope of the Brussels regime.  These 
scholars doubt the correctness of Rüffer in the light of subsequent cases, and advocate a 
systemic and ‘green’ interpretation of EU law concerning the protection of the environment. 
The Rüffer approach to ‘civil and commercial matters’ has been criticised as being 
inconsistent with the CJEU decisions in Sonntag86 and Baten.87  Sonntag concerned a claim for 
damages against a German state-school teacher for the accidental death of a pupil in his care 
on a school trip.  The CJEU held that the fact that the defendant had the status of a civil servant 
under German law and acted in that capacity at the relevant time was irrelevant.88  So was the 
fact that the case was covered by a scheme of social insurance under German public law that 
                                                 
83 For English traditional conflict of laws see L. Collins and others (eds), Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict 
of Laws (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 15th ed, 2012) Ch 5. 
84 See n 33 above. 
85 Betlem and Bernasconi, above, n 21; T. Kadner Graziano, ‘The Law Applicable to Cross-Border Damage to 
the Environment: A Commentary on Article 7 of the Rome II Regulation’ (2007) 9 Yearbook of Private 
International Law 71; R. Plender and M. Wilderspin, The European Private International Law of Obligations 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd ed, 2009). See also A. Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts 
(Oxford: OUP, 2014). 
86 Case C-172/91 Volker Sonntag v Hans Waidmann, Elisabeth Waidmann and Stefan Waidmann [1993] ECR I-
1963. 
87 Case C-271/00 Gemeente Steenbergen v Luc Baten [2002] ECR I-10489. 
88 Sonntag [1993] ECR I-1963, [21]. 
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excluded a direct claim against the defendant.89  The Court found that the functions of the 
public authority should be analysed to determine whether its conduct constitutes the exercise 
of public powers going beyond those existing under the rules applicable to relationship between 
private individuals.90  Since a teacher in a state school assumes the same functions in relation 
to their pupils as a teacher in a private school, the conduct of the former does not constitute the 
exercise of public powers.91  Baten concerned a claim by a Dutch local authority for the 
recovery of sums of money paid as social assistance to support the defendant’s child after the 
defendant had been divorced from the child’s mother.  The CJEU held that it was necessary to 
examine the basis and the detailed rules governing the bringing of the claim to determine 
whether it concerned a civil or commercial matter.92  Since the Dutch legislation allows 
recovery of the costs of social assistance up to the limit of the maintenance obligation under 
the Dutch Civil Code, it was the rules of civil law nature that determined the conditions under 
which the public authority might bring an action for the recovery of sums of money paid.93  
The claimant’s legal situation was, therefore, comparable to that of a person who, having paid 
another’s debt, is subrogated to the rights of the original creditor and to that of a person who, 
having suffered damage from a third party, seeks compensation from that party.94  The CJEU 
also stated that the conclusion would be different if the local authority had the power to 
disregard a maintenance agreement entered into between the defendant and his ex-wife.95 
Similarly, Betlem, Bernasconi, Kadner Graziano, Plender and Wilderspin96 argue that 
the fact that public authorities enforcing environmental standards or claiming clean-up costs 
                                                 
89 ibid [28]. 
90 ibid [22]. 
91 ibid [23]. 
92 Baten [2002] ECR I-10489, [31]. 
93 ibid [32]. 
94 ibid [34]. 
95 ibid [35]-[36]. 
96 Betlem and Bernasconi, above, n 21, 133-135; Kadner Graziano, above, n 24, 81-85; Plender and Wilderspin, 
above, n 85, [21-021]. 
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under the Environmental Liability Directive act in their public capacity is irrelevant.  The real 
question is whether their conduct constitutes the exercise of any powers going beyond those 
existing under the rules applicable to relations between private individuals.  Since claims for 
the enforcement of environmental standards and recovery of clean-up costs against foreign 
operators typically arise in tort and, moreover, in some Member States can be made not just by 
public authorities but also by non-governmental environmental organisations,97 such claims 
concern ‘civil and commercial matters’, irrespective of the nature of the claimant. 
Furthermore, according to the mentioned scholars, the systemic interpretation of the 
Brussels regime leads to the conclusion that claims by public authorities under the 
Environmental Liability Directive fall within its scope.  The Directive acknowledges potential 
actions by public authorities against foreign operators but provides no special procedures.  
According to Kadner Graziano, Plender and Wilderspin, such actions must fall within the scope 
of the Brussels regime in order to be truly enforceable.98  Similarly, the special choice-of-law 
rules for environmental damage of Article 7 of Rome II, whose scope must be interpreted 
consistently with that of the Brussels regime,99 apply to cases of environmental damage 
irrespective of any harm to life, health property or financial wellbeing of individuals.  In cases 
of pure environmental damage, only public authorities, acting under the Directive, can 
commence proceedings for the enforcement of environmental standards and recovery of clean-
up costs.  Since Article 7 of Rome II applies to cases of pure environmental damage, Kadner 
Graziano argues that claims by public authorities concerning such damage under the Directive 
must fall within the scope of Rome II and therefore also the Brussels regime.100  Betlem, 
                                                 
97 See e.g. Bier [1976] ECR 1735, where a claimant was the Reinwater Foundation, Akpan v Shell (2013) LJN 
BY9854 (the Netherlands), where a claimant was Friends of the Earth Netherlands (Milieudefensie) and Arica 
Victims KB v Boliden Mineral AB (2013) T. 1021–13 (Sweden), where the claimant was Arica Victims KB, an 
association representing a number of people from Arica, Chile. 
98 Kadner Graziano, above, n 85, 83-84; Plender and Wilderspin, above, n 85, [21-021]. 
99 Rome II, Recital 7. 
100 Kadner Graziano, above, n 85, 85-86. 
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Bernasconi, Plender and Wilderspin further rely on the Henkel case,101 where the CJEU held 
that a claim by a consumer protection organisation for an injunction to prevent a trader using 
allegedly unfair terms in its consumer contracts fell within the scope of the Brussels 
jurisdictional regime in general and the rule of jurisdiction in tort in particular (now contained 
in Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Recast) on the basis that this interpretation was the only one 
consistent with the Unfair Contract Terms Directive.102  Finally, according to Betlem and 
Bernasconi,103 the conclusion that claims by public authorities under the Directive concern 
‘civil and commercial matters’ is supported by the ‘green’ interpretation of EU law concerning 
the protection of the environment.  Since the application of the Brussels regime to claims by 
public authorities increases the chances of the operators’ liability, thus supporting the polluter-
pays principle, such interpretation is to be preferred. 
The majority of scholars (including the editors of Dicey, Morris & Collins), however, 
are of the opinion that claims by public authorities under the Environmental Liability Directive 
do not concern ‘civil and commercial matters’, and thus fall outside the scope of the Brussels 
regime.104  They all rely on Rüffer for this conclusion.  Indeed, Rüffer seems a stronger authority 
than Sonntag, Henkel and Baten.105  In Sonntag, a crucial point in the CJEU analysis was that 
a teacher in a state school and a teacher in a private school assume the same functions in relation 
to their pupils.  With regard to claims by public authorities under the Directive, such a private 
                                                 
101 Case C-167/00 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Henkel [2002] ECR I-8111.  See Betlem and Bernasconi, 
above, n 21, 136; Plender and Wilderspin, above, n 85, [21-021]. 
102 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [2003] OJ L95/29 (‘Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive’). 
103 Betlem and Bernasconi, above, n 21, 135-137. 
104 M. Bogdan, ‘The Treatment of Environmental Damage in Regulation Rome II’ in J. Ahern and W. Binchy, 
The Rome II Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations: A New International Litigation 
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The Rome II Regulation: The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Regulations (Oxford: OUP, 2008) [7.03]-[7.06]; 
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105 Interestingly, Plender and Wilderspin, who are of the opinion that claims by public authorities under the 
Directive are within the scope of the Brussels regime, state that Betlem and Bernasconi’s attempt to distinguish 
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comparator is absent.  The role of non-governmental environmental organisations under the 
Directive is limited to submitting any observations concerning environmental damage to public 
authorities, requesting action from public authorities, and commencing review proceedings of 
public authorities’ decisions in response to the request.106  It is also for this reason that Henkel 
is distinguishable.107  Here, the claim was brought under the Austrian implementation of the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive, which expressly envisages court and administrative actions 
by persons or organisations having a legitimate interest in protecting consumers for the 
enforcement of its terms.108  It was the claimant’s status as a non-governmental consumer 
organisation, and not the fact that it was pursuing an action to enforce EU law, that brought the 
claim within the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’.  The Environmental Liability 
Directive, on the other hand, achieves its objectives by conferring enforcement powers on the 
Member State public authorities.  In Baten, it was the rules of the Dutch Civil Code that 
determined the conditions under which the public authority might bring an action for the 
recovery of sums of money paid.109  The recovery of clean-up costs under the Directive is 
independent of the rules of civil law nature.  Indeed, there seems to be an agreement in the 
literature that the Directive takes an administrative approach that is strongly influenced by the 
situation in the US, where at the federal level environmental clean-up is in the hands of the 
Environmental Protection Agency.110 
Furthermore, Dickinson and Fuchs provide counter-arguments to the systemic 
interpretation of the scope of the Brussels regime advanced by Kadner Graziano, Plender and 
                                                 
106 Environmental Liability Directive, Articles 12 and 13. 
107 Also Dickinson, above, n 104, [7.05]. 
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Wilderspin.111  The cross-border enforcement of environmental standards and recovery of 
clean-up costs by public authorities involve mutual assistance, which is the subject of an EU 
measure under Article 192 TFEU, not private international law instruments adopted under 
Articles 67 and 81 TFEU.112  It is counterintuitive and contrary to the CJEU approach under 
the Brussels regime to determine its scope by relying on the content of a choice-of-law rule of 
Rome II.113 
In conclusion, arguments on whether claims of public authorities under the 
Environmental Liability Directive fall within the scope of the Brussels I Recast are finely 
balanced.  Assuming that the majority view is correct, the narrow scope of this instrument 
seems to prevent an important type of international environmental litigation from taking place 
in Europe.114  In any event, the legal uncertainty surrounding this issue may serve in itself as a 
deterrent to public authorities bringing transnational claims under the Directive.  Coupled with 
the fact that international environmental litigation against the parents of corporate groups 
seems to be effectively confined to extraction and chemical industries, this finding leads to the 
conclusion that the field in which European private international law can have a regulatory 
impact on the protection of the environment is relatively narrow.  This regulatory field is in 
effect limited to two types of case, namely the case of private claimants suing an operator 
whose actions in one country directly cause environmental damage elsewhere and the Lubbe v 
Cape type, but the latter exclusively with regard to extraction and chemical industries, given 
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112 Dickinson, above, n 104, [7.06]. 
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CA) (Can), where an Ontario court gave summary judgment to enforce judgments obtained pursuant to US 
environmental agency clean-up legislation, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act 1980), 42 USC § 9670(a).  In its discussion of the rule concerning penal, revenue, or other public 
laws, the lower courts carefully examined the US judgment, characterising it as primarily a cost recovery measure, 
and the degree to which the ‘public law’ prohibition applied to hybrid regulatory regimes that included civil 
liability: ibid 684-689. 
36 
 
the adherence of these industries to old-fashioned forms of corporate organisation.  The 
following sections analyse how, within the scope of their practical operation, the rules of 
European private international law apply to these two types of case in order to examine 
whether, and to what extent, this field of law is achieving its regulatory potential.  The analysis 
starts with the rules of jurisdiction. 
 
Adjudicatory jurisdiction and environmental damage 
The Brussels I Recast allocates adjudicatory jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters 
among the Member State courts.  Its jurisdictional rules apply, in principle, to defendants 
domiciled in a Member State.115  The main rule is that the courts of the Member State of the 
defendant’s domicile have general jurisdiction over the defendant.116  There are also rules of 
special jurisdiction which confer jurisdiction, with regard to specific matters, on the courts of 
other Member States.  Since international environmental litigation typically concerns tortious 
claims, the rules of jurisdiction in tort are of particular relevance.  International environmental 
litigation in EU courts sometimes involves defendants not domiciled in a Member State.  In 
such cases, the Brussels I Recast delegates jurisdictional issues to the Member States’ 
traditional laws.  It will now be examined how these jurisdictional rules apply to the two types 
of case in which European private international law can have a regulatory impact that have 
been identified in the previous section. 
                                                 
115 Brussels I Recast, Articles 4-6.  Domicile of legal persons is defined autonomously in Article 63.  See Vava v 
Anglo American South Africa Ltd [2013] EWHC 2131 (QB), [2013] Bus LR D65 (a company’s central 
administration amounted to its centre of management or operational centre; it depended on where the company 
itself carried out its functions).  According to Article 62, domicile of individuals is to be determined by reference 
to the Member States’ traditional laws. 
116 ibid Article 4(1). 
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Claims against an operator domiciled in a Member State whose actions in one country 
directly cause environmental damage elsewhere can be brought in the courts of the operator’s 
domicile117 or in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur.118  
The leading case on the determination of the place of the harmful event in delocalised torts is 
Bier.119  It will be remembered that this case concerned a French mining company that had 
polluted the Rhine by discharging in it in France saline waste from its operations.  A Dutch 
horticulturalist suffered damage as a result.  The CJEU held that the claimant had an option to 
commence proceedings ‘either at the place where the damage occurred or the place of the event 
giving rise to it.’120  The CJEU case law on jurisdiction in delocalised torts also deals with 
claims for indirect damage (i.e. damage suffered by the victim as a consequence of the direct 
damage) and claims brought by indirect victims.  The case law demonstrates that the 
jurisdictionally relevant places are only the place where the direct victim suffers direct damage 
and the place of the event giving rise to it.121  Claims against an operator domiciled in a Member 
State that acts in one Member State and directly causes environmental damage in another can 
therefore be brought either in the courts for the place where the direct victim suffers direct 
damage or at the source of the pollution. 
The Lubbe v Cape type of case involving a European-based parent company operating 
in an extraction or chemical industry that carries on its activities in a developing country 
through a local subsidiary falls within the scope of the Brussels I Recast.  The courts of the 
Member State of the defendant’s domicile have general jurisdiction.122  This type of case has 
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been frequently brought in the English and recently in the Dutch courts, and typically concerns 
direct liability in negligence of the European-based parent. 
An issue litigated in the past in England in this type of case was whether the English 
courts should refuse to exercise their jurisdiction and stay their proceedings under the 
traditional English doctrine of forum non conveniens in favour of the courts of the developing 
country where the harmful event occurred.123  The CJEU held that the forum non conveniens 
doctrine had no role to play in cases falling within the scope of the Brussels Convention and 
the Brussels I Regulation.124  The Brussels I Recast superseded the Brussels I Regulation on 
10 January 2015.  The Recast introduces one important change that has the potential to 
undermine international environmental litigation in EU courts.  Unlike the Brussels I 
Regulation, the Recast gives an amount of discretion to all Member State courts to stay their 
proceedings when parallel or related proceedings are already pending in a third country.  
According to Articles 33(1) and 34(1) of the Recast, where the jurisdiction of a Member State 
court is based on certain jurisdictional rules of the Recast, including all the rules relevant for 
international environmental litigation, and where at the time when the Member State court is 
seised with the dispute parallel or related proceedings are pending in a third country, the 
Member State court may stay its proceedings under two conditions.  The first is that it is 
expected that the court of the third country will give a judgment capable of recognition and, 
where applicable, of enforcement in the Member State concerned.  The second is that the court 
of the Member State is satisfied that a stay is necessary for the proper administration of justice.  
Recital 24 clarifies the second condition: 
                                                 
123 The leading case on the doctrine of forum non conveniens is Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd 
[1987] AC 460 (HL). 
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‘When taking into account the proper administration of justice, the court of the Member 
State concerned should assess all the circumstances of the case before it.  Such 
circumstances may include connections between the facts of the case and the parties 
and the third State concerned, the stage to which the proceedings in the third State have 
progressed by the time proceedings are initiated in the court of the Member State and 
whether or not the court of the third State can be expected to give a judgment within a 
reasonable time.’ 
Articles 33(1) and 34(1) could lead to a ‘race to the court’, with the European-based parent 
company and its overseas subsidiary commencing preventive proceedings in the developing 
country where the harmful event occurred.  In such cases, the Member State court seised with 
the claim against the parent may refuse to hear and decide the dispute under what comes close 
to the forum non conveniens doctrine. 
English cases such as Lubbe v Cape125 and Connelly v RTZ126 dealing with forum non 
conveniens in the context of international environmental litigation have therefore regained 
relevance.  These cases confirm that the fundamental principle in forum non conveniens cases 
is to identify the most appropriate forum in which the case may be tried suitably for the interests 
of all the parties and the ends of justice.  The English courts are instructed to look not just for 
the ‘natural forum’, i.e. the forum with which the action has its most real and substantial 
connection, but also to examine, if the natural forum is abroad, whether there are special 
circumstances by reason of which justice requires that litigation should nevertheless take place 
in England.  In both Lubbe v Cape and Connelly v RTZ the natural forum was abroad, in South 
Africa and Namibia, respectively.  Both cases therefore revolved around the issue of whether 
the claimants would obtain justice in the natural forum.  In both cases the House of Lords found 
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that the claimants would not be able to obtain legal representation in the natural forum, and 
consequently refused to stay the proceeding under the forum non conveniens doctrine. 
The Lubbe v Cape type of case may concern a claim brought in one Member State 
against a parent company domiciled in another.  The court seised with the claim will not have 
general jurisdiction over such parent.  Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Recast will be inapplicable, 
since the harmful event will have occurred in a third country.  The only other rule of special 
jurisdiction of the Recast that the claimants could rely on is Article 7(3) which gives 
jurisdiction to a court seised with criminal proceedings over a civil claim for damages or 
restitution which is based on the criminal act giving rise to such proceedings.  This rule of 
jurisdiction is of potential relevance for Member States that deal with transnational 
environmental cases primarily through criminal law.127 
In cases of international environmental litigation in which the defendant is domiciled 
in a third country, the Brussels I Recast delegates jurisdictional issues to the Member States’ 
traditional laws.  If the proceedings are commenced in England, for example, the English courts 
will have jurisdiction over the defendant that is properly served with the claim form whilst 
present in England.128  The English courts, however, may decide not to exercise their 
jurisdiction and stay their proceedings under the forum non conveniens doctrine.  Corporate 
defendants domiciled in third countries, however, are seldom present in England for 
jurisdictional purposes.  The majority of cases brought in England against non-EU defendant 
thus revolve around the issue of whether the English courts should grant the claimant 
                                                 
127 E.g. France: see D. Papadopoulou, ‘The Role of French Environmental Associations in Civil Liability for 
Environmental Harm: Courtesy of Erika’ (2009) 21 Journal of Environmental Law 87, discussing the judgment 
of the Paris Tribunal Correctionnel of 16 January 2008, No 99-34-895010, concerning the Erika oil spill. The 
criminal court awarded 192 million euros in private law damages against the defendants (an Italian shipping 
classification society, the ship owner, the manager and the charterer) in favour of certain French environmental 
associations and local administrative authorities. 
128 The leading cases on the presence of companies in England for jurisdictional purposes are Dunlop Pneumatic 
Tyre Co. Ltd v A.G. Cudell & Co [1902] 1 KB 342 (CA) and Adams v Cape Industries [1990] 2 WLR 657 (CA).  
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permission to serve the claim form on an absent defendant out of the jurisdiction.129  Permission 
depends on the claimant being able to satisfy three requirements.  First, the claimant must have 
a reasonable prospect of success on the merits.130  Second, the claimant must have a good 
arguable case that the claim falls within a head of jurisdiction listed in Civil Procedure Rules, 
Practice Direction 6B.131  Since international environmental litigation typically concerns 
tortious claims, para 3.1(9) of the Practice Direction 6B is of particular relevance.  Under this 
provision, the English courts may assume jurisdiction if damage was sustained within the 
jurisdiction or the damage resulted from an act committed within the jurisdiction.  Unlike 
Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Recast, the case law demonstrates that para 3.1(9) of the Practice 
Direction 6B applies not just when the direct victim suffers direct damage in England or when 
the place of the event giving rise to it is in England but also when either the direct victim suffers 
indirect damage or when the indirect victim suffers damage in England.132  Third, England 
must be forum conveniens.133 
International environmental litigation of the Lubbe v Cape type sometimes involves not 
just a claim against a European-based parent company but also a claim against its subsidiary 
domiciled in or outside the EU.  Claimants can rely on Article 8(1) of the Brussels I Recast 
concerning jurisdiction over co-defendants to establish jurisdiction over subsidiaries domiciled 
in the EU.  With regard to non-EU subsidiaries, claimants will have to invoke the Member 
States’ traditional rules of jurisdiction.  If the proceedings against a non-EU subsidiary are 
commenced in England, for example, the claimants can rely on para 3.1(3) of the Practice 
Direction 6B concerning jurisdiction over necessary or proper parties.  The other two 
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requirements for service out of the jurisdiction, namely a reasonable prospect of success on the 
merits and forum conveniens, will also have to be satisfied.  Given that the English courts are 
loath to split up proceedings involving co-defendants,134 it seems that claimants will easily 
satisfy these requirements.135 
In conclusion, the rules of jurisdiction of the Brussels I Recast deal satisfactorily with 
the type of international environmental litigation in which the claim is brought against an EU 
domiciliary acting in one Member State and directly causing environmental damage in another.  
In such cases, victims may access several forums, most importantly the courts for the place of 
the direct damage suffered by direct victims.  This place usually coincides with the habitual 
residence of direct victims and the place where the damaged property is located.  If a claim for 
a delocalised tort is brought against a non-EU domiciliary, the jurisdiction of the Member State 
court seised with the claim depends on the traditional law of that Member State.  The English 
traditional jurisdictional rules applicable in this type of case, for example, seem to be somewhat 
wider than the analogous jurisdictional rules of the Brussels I Recast.  These rules therefore 
also put victims in this type of case in a good litigational position. 
With regard to the Lubbe v Cape type of case, the jurisdictional rules of the Brussels I 
Recast are also favourable for victims as they may commence proceedings against a parent 
company domiciled in the EU in the courts of its domicile, and those courts must hear and 
decide the case.  The Recast, however, represents a setback for this type of case as it introduces 
a discretion that comes close to the forum non conveniens doctrine.  Although Lubbe v Cape136 
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and Connelly v RTZ137 show that the English courts have been reluctant to use this doctrine in 
the context of international environmental litigation, there is no guarantee that the attitude of 
the CJEU, which is the ultimate interpreter of the Recast, will be the same.138  The Lubbe v 
Cape type of case also sometimes concerns a claim against a subsidiary domiciled either in or 
outside the EU.  Both the Brussels I Recast and the English traditional rules of jurisdiction 
provide for this scenario.  In theory, the Lubbe v Cape type of case could also concern a claim 
against a non-EU parent.  Such cases, however, do not arise in practice, possibly because it 
would be hard to obtain jurisdiction of the Member State courts in such cases. 
The following text continues the examination of the regulation of the environment in 
European private international law by exploring how the special choice-of-law rules for 
environmental damage of Rome II apply to the two types of case in which European private 
international law can have a regulatory impact. 
 
Choice of law and the Bier type of case 
Article 7 of Rome II contains special choice-of-law rules for environmental damage: 
‘The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of environmental 
damage or damage sustained by persons or property as a result of such damage shall be 
the law determined pursuant to Article 4(1), unless the person seeking compensation 
for damage chooses to base his or her claim on the law of the country in which the event 
giving rise to the damage occurred.’ 
                                                 
137 [1998] AC 854. 
138 Similarly, W. van den Eeckhout, ‘Corporate Human Rights Violations and Private International Law – The 
Hinge Function and Conductivity of Private International Law in Implementing Human Rights in Civil 
Proceedings in Europe: A Facilitative Role for PIL or PIL as a Complicating Factor?’ (2012) 4 Contemporary 
Readings in Law and Social Justice 178, 186-187. 
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Article 4(1), in turn, provides: 
‘…the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall be 
the law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in which 
the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries 
in which the indirect consequences of that event occur.’ 
For the purposes of these rules, ‘environmental damage’ is defined as an ‘adverse change in a 
natural resource, such as water, land or air, impairment of a function performed by that resource 
for the benefit of another natural resource or the public, or impairment of the variability among 
living organisms.’139  Also relevant are Articles 14 (‘Freedom of choice’), 16 (‘Overriding 
mandatory rules’), 17 (‘Rules of safety and conduct’) and 26 (‘Public policy’). 
The scope of Article 7 is wide, although there is some uncertainty in this respect.  It 
clearly covers personal injury, property damage, economic loss and pure environmental 
damage.  It is also clear that nuclear damage is excluded.140  According to some scholars, 
Article 7 is wide enough to cover cases brought under the English law of negligence, trespass, 
nuisance, Rylands v Fletcher141 and breach of statutory duty.142  Others, however, interpret the 
scope of Article 7 more narrowly.143 
The special choice-of-law rules for environmental damage are based on the principles 
of ubiquity, favouring the victim and, to a limited extent, party autonomy.  Article 7 provides 
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that the law applicable to environmental damage is by default the law of the country of the 
damage (lex loci damni), but the victim can choose the law of the country of the event giving 
rise to the damage (lex loci actus).  There is no rule allowing the courts to apply the law of the 
parties’ common habitual residence or the law that is manifestly more closely connected with 
the tort.  The question when the victim can make the choice is one of procedure, governed by 
the law of the forum.144  If the lex loci damni applies, Article 17 becomes relevant.  It provides 
that, in assessing the conduct of the person claimed to be liable, account should be taken, as a 
matter of fact and in so far as is appropriate, of the rules of safety and conduct in force at the 
place and time of the event giving rise to the damage.  This provision allows the court, when 
determining liability, to take into account the fact that the defendant, who is sued for damage 
suffered in one country and under the law of that country, has complied with the public law 
rules concerning safety and conduct of the lex loci actus.  Article 14 allows the parties to agree 
on the applicable law either after the event giving rise to the damage occurred or, where all the 
parties are pursuing a commercial activity, even by an agreement freely negotiated before the 
event giving rise to the damage occurred.  Article 16 allows the court to apply the overriding 
mandatory provisions of the law of the forum.  Article 26 allows the court to disregard a 
provision of the foreign applicable law whose application is manifestly incompatible with the 
public policy of the forum. 
Some of the ideas that motivated the CJEU decisions in Bier145 and other jurisdictional 
cases on delocalised torts146 underlie Article 7 of Rome II.  Just as a claimant whose claim falls 
within the scope of the Brussels I Recast may commence proceedings either in the country 
where the direct victim suffers direct damage or in the country of the event giving rise to it, so 
can the victim of environmental damage advance their claim under the law of either country 
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under Rome II.  The scopes of the Recast and Rome II, however, differ in an important respect.  
Whilst the jurisdictional rules of the Recast apply in civil and commercial matters and, in 
principle, to defendants domiciled in a Member State,147 Rome II is of universal application.  
It applies, in all situations involving a conflict of laws, to non-contractual obligations in civil 
and commercial matters regardless of whether the applicable law is the law of a Member 
State.148  In other words, whilst the Brussels I Recast regime is concerned only with torts 
connected with the EU, Rome II, at least in theory, applies to all delocalised torts regardless of 
the place of the environmental damage or the defendant’s actions. 
Universal application of Rome II, coupled with the superiority of the principles of 
ubiquity and favouring the victim and the limited acceptance of party autonomy on which its 
special choice-of-law rules for environmental damage are based, are the main grounds on 
which the supporters of these rules base their conclusion that Rome II adequately pursues the 
cosmopolitan objectives of EU environmental policy.149  Comparative overviews of choice-of-
law rules for environmental damage disclose a diversity of connecting factors.150  For example, 
some point exclusively to the lex loci damni, others exclusively to the lex loci actus.  In some 
countries, the applicable law is determined pursuant to the principle of the closest connection.  
Some countries allow party autonomy.  Some do not.  But all of these connecting factors on 
their own and the unlimited acceptance of party autonomy have certain drawbacks when 
compared with the special choice-of-law rules of Rome II. 
The connecting factor of the place of the damage is said to be protective of the victim’s 
interests as it often coincides with their habitual residence and the place where the damaged 
                                                 
147 Brussels I Recast, Articles 1, 4-6. 
148 Rome II, Articles 1, 3. 
149 See n 21 above. 
150 Betlem and Bernasconi, above, n 21, 137-150; Bernasconi, above, n 32, 29-38; K. Fach Gomez, ‘The Law 
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Yearbook of Private International Law 291, 296- 303; C. von Bar, ‘Environmental Damage in Private 
International Law’ (1997) 268 Recueil des Cours 291, 363-377. 
47 
 
property is located.151  It is further justified by the fact that the main objective of tort law is 
compensation for the harm suffered, often under the system of strict liability, not vengeance or 
retribution.152  In the words of the European Commission: ‘The basic connection to the law of 
the place where the damage was sustained is in conformity with recent objectives of 
environmental protection policy, which tends to support strict liability.’153  The downside of 
this connecting factor is that the victim cannot invoke the potentially higher environmental 
standards of the country of the tortious action.154  According to the European Commission: 
‘Applying exclusively the law of the place where the damage is sustained could give an 
operator an incentive to establish his facilities at the border so as to discharge toxic substances 
into a river and enjoy the benefit of the neighbouring country’s laxer rules.’155  Furthermore, 
since environmental damage can be suffered in more than one country, claims of victims of the 
same tortious action may fall under different applicable laws containing different 
environmental standards.156  This is a serious downside for a rule called to deal with mass torts 
where ideally all victims should be treated equally.157 
The connecting factor of the place of the event giving rise to the damage avoids the 
potential application of different laws to claims of victims of the same tortious action.  It is also 
often justified with the tortfeasor’s interests in mind – the tortfeasor can be expected to know 
and comply with the law of the country of the event but not with the potentially multiple laws 
of the countries of the damage.158  The downside of this connecting factor is that it gives 
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countries that already host polluting industries an incentive to decrease their environmental 
standards where the environmentally detrimental and degrading effects of those industries are 
exclusively or primarily felt across the border.159  It also increases the incentives of operators 
moving to the country with the laxest standards and could lead to a ‘race to the bottom’.160  The 
lex loci actus can be a law unconnected and unfamiliar to the victim, whose application they 
do not expect.161  In international environmental litigation there is no justification for favouring 
the interests of polluters over those of victims. 
The principle of the closest connection is also not an optimal solution.  The most closely 
connected country will ordinarily be either the country of the damage or the country of the 
event giving rise to the damage.  The downsides of these two connecting factors are therefore 
attributable to the principle of the closest connection. 
With regard to party autonomy, there is a concern that the operator, typically a big 
corporation, might abuse its typically superior bargaining power and impose upon the potential 
victims of environmental damage the application of the law favourable for it.  That is why 
Rome II does not allow ex ante choice-of-law agreements, assuming they are practically 
possible in the context of international environmental litigation.162  Ex post choice-of-law 
agreements, on the other hand, are considered useful and appropriate as they enable the 
operator and all the victims to agree on the application of only one law, thus facilitating the 
settlement of disputes.163  Ex post choice-of-law agreements do not raise concerns of the abuse 
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of the operator’s typically superior bargaining power, since the victim, after the risk 
materialises, is in a position to assess the pros and cons of the application of different laws.  
They will not easily give up their rights under the law(s) applicable by default, and will agree 
to the application of another law only if they consider that to be in their interest.  A further 
concern is that party autonomy should not be used to undermine the rights and obligations of 
third parties. 
The special choice-of-law rules for environmental damage of Rome II are considered 
superior to choice-of-law rules based on the connecting factors considered above.  By opting 
for the alternative application of the lex loci damni and the lex loci actus, Article 7 combines 
the positive characteristics of the two connecting factors, whilst avoiding most of their 
downsides.  In particular, it reduces the problem of potential application of different laws to 
claims of victims of the same tortious action.  It neither gives operators an incentive to establish 
their facilities at the border so as to enjoy the application of the neighbouring country’s laxer 
environmental standards nor leads to a ‘race to the bottom’.  It provides for the default 
application of the lex loci damni.  The default rule seems to be based on the assumption that 
the victim will typically commence proceedings in the country of their habitual residence where 
they suffer personal injury, property damage and economic loss, thus leading to the application 
of the local law.164  But the victim can choose the lex loci actus if it is more favourable for 
them, i.e. if it contains higher standards.  Furthermore, Article 7 is justifiable in terms of 
legitimate expectations, fairness and state interests.165  Operators should expect the application 
of the law of the country of the tortious action and, to a certain extent, of the country of the 
damage.  Victims, on the other hand, typically expect the application of the law of the country 
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where their injured interests are situated, but also have an interest in the application of the 
higher standards of the lex loci actus.  The state of the tortious action has an interest in ensuring 
compliance with its standards, whereas the state of the damage has an interest in protecting its 
environment.  In addition, the latter country has no interest in displacing higher standards of 
the former country as doing so would lead to a higher risk of environmental damage in the 
latter country.  It is for all these reasons that Article 7 is said to pursue the cosmopolitan 
objective of raising the general level of environmental protection on the basis of the universally 
accepted principles of environmental law.166 
But this conclusion does not sufficiently take into account the context in which 
international environmental litigation takes place.  In some cases, as Bier167 and Land 
Oberösterreich v ČEZ168 demonstrate, the environmental damage and the tortious action occur 
in different countries.  Indeed, Article 7 produces beneficial effects in this type of case.  But 
both Bier and Land Oberösterreich v ČEZ, and presumably the vast majority of cases of this 
type that end up in EU courts concern intra-EU delocalised environmental torts.  Presumably, 
the minority of cases concern delocalised environmental torts where one of the elements of the 
tort occurs within and the other outside the EU.  It is unlikely that the Member State courts will 
be seised with a claim concerning the Bier type of case where both elements of the tort occur 
entirely outside the EU.  The exception is where a delocalised environmental tort is committed 
by an overseas subsidiary of a European parent company.  But this is the Lubbe v Cape type of 
case, to which this article now turns.  In conclusion, the effect of Article 7 in the Bier type of 
case is to raise the level of environmental protection within the EU and at its borders, which in 
itself falls short of the proclaimed cosmopolitan objectives. 
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Choice of law and the Lubbe v Cape type of case 
In the Lubbe v Cape type of case, environmental damage is typically suffered in a developing 
country as a result of the local activities of a multinational corporation carried on through a 
local subsidiary.  Victims typically commence proceedings against the parent company in its 
home country for breaching a duty of care that it allegedly owes them directly.  Sometimes 
victims argue that the parent should be liable for the actions of the subsidiary on the basis of 
the piercing of the corporate veil, enterprise liability, agency and similar doctrines. 
A recent development in English substantive law, the Court of Appeal decision in 
Chandler v Cape,169 might encourage overseas victims to bring ‘foreign direct liability’ cases 
in the English courts.  This case resembles Lubbe v Cape,170 the main difference being that it 
had no international elements.  In a nutshell, Mr Chandler was employed by a defendant’s 
subsidiary.  Asbestos was produced on the site where he worked.  Some fifty years later Mr 
Chandler contracted asbestosis.  As his former employer had been dissolved, he commenced 
proceedings against the parent company.  The trial judge found in favour of the claimant.  The 
Court of Appeal confirmed that a duty of care should be imposed on the defendant for the 
health and safety of its subsidiary’s employees because (i) the businesses of the two companies 
were in a relevant respect the same, and the parent (ii) had, or ought to have had, superior 
knowledge on some relevant aspect of health and safety in the particular industry, (iii) knew, 
or ought to have known, that the subsidiary’s system of work was unsafe, and (iv) knew, or 
ought to have foreseen, that the subsidiary or its employees would rely on its using that superior 
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knowledge for the employees’ protection.171  It seems that a duty of care can be imposed on 
the same grounds on a parent company for the health and safety of people living in the area of 
its subsidiary’s operations.  If an international environmental litigation is brought in England 
under Chandler, the main question will be whether English law applies to the issue of the 
parent’s liability because only then can a duty of care be imposed on a parent domiciled in 
England for the environmental damage caused by its overseas subsidiary under the principles 
laid down in Chandler. 
The answer to this question will largely depend on the classification of the relevant 
issue.  In Chandler, Arden LJ ‘emphatically reject[ed] any suggestion that this court [was] in 
any way concerned with what is usually referred to as piercing the corporate veil’172 and 
clarified that ‘[t]he question is simply whether what the parent company did amounted to taking 
on a direct duty to the subsidiary’s employees.’173  The tortious classification of the relevant 
issue in English substantive law, however, is not determinative for the purposes of Rome II.  
This instrument applies ‘in situations involving a conflict of laws, to non-contractual 
obligations in civil and commercial matters.’174  Some civil and commercial matters are 
expressly excluded from the scope of Rome II, most importantly for the present discussion 
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‘non-contractual obligations arising out of the law of companies...such as...the personal 
liability of...members as such for the obligations of the company.’175  Whether an issue is a 
matter of company law is determined by autonomous interpretation.176  If the issue of whether 
a parent company is liable under the Chandler principles is a company law matter for the 
purposes of Rome II, then the traditional choice-of-law rules will determine whether English 
law applies.  If not, the choice-of-law rules of Rome II will provide the answer. 
 
(1) ‘Foreign direct liability’: a matter of tort law or company law? 
Separate legal personality of the company and its shareholders and their limited liability are 
two of the oldest doctrines in company law.177  They are a product of the early Industrial 
Revolution.  Capital needed by the companies of the first half of the nineteenth century to 
exploit the emerging technology and conduct major infrastructure projects was raised from the 
public through sale of shares.  The resulting separation between investors and managers 
required the limitation of liability of the former to the amount of their investment.  Moreover, 
any potential liability of subsequent purchasers of shares beyond the amount of their investment 
would have reduced the marketability of shares and affected the functioning of stock 
exchanges.178 Limited liability also encourages entrepreneurial activity and reduces monitoring 
costs for investors, thus further promoting the marketability of shares and the diversification 
of investors’ share portfolios. 
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Limited liability arose at a time when, except by a special act of the legislature, a 
company could not own shares in another company.179  In England this occurred in 1855 
through the passing of the Limited Liability Act.  Corporate groups became possible only later.  
The key feature of the latter development was the extension of limited liability to parent 
companies within corporate groups.  However, as Blumberg notes, no court has ever examined, 
in a case involving the liability of a parent for the actions of its subsidiary, whether the doctrine 
of limited liability should protect the parent to the same extent that it protects 
shareholders/investors from corporate debts.180  Unlike investors in a company who are 
detached from its management, a parent and its subsidiary form part of a single economic entity 
under the control of the former.  When applied to involuntary creditors of a group, e.g. the 
victims of environmental damage caused by a subsidiary, the extension of limited liability 
shifts the risk of liability onto them.181  But this shifting of risk is hard to justify.  Unlike 
voluntary creditors of the group who knowingly and willingly assume the risks associated with 
the parent’s limited liability, typically in return for consideration, involuntary creditors are in 
a fundamentally different position.  The parent can externalise the risk without having to 
compensate them.  Although it may be argued that limited liability is needed to ensure that the 
group will take on the enterprise risk, such argument is inapplicable where creating a subsidiary 
is done purely for business organisation purposes.182  Even where a subsidiary is established as 
a vehicle for new and risky investments, the shifting of the risk of liability onto involuntary 
creditors is hard to justify in the light of the fact that they are typically uninsured and in a much 
worse position than the group to obtain insurance.183  Furthermore, the risk of moral hazard 
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speaks against the parent’s limited liability in such situations.184  The courts have never 
inquired whether this radical development required a reconsideration of the doctrine of limited 
liability.  Although there have been calls for shifting the focus from the liability of individual 
members of a group to enterprise liability185 such calls remain largely theoretical. 
Limited liability, of course, is not absolute.  In English company law, for example, 
exceptions include the piercing of the corporate veil and the common-law concepts of agency 
law.  But these exceptions fail to provide an adequate solution in most cases.  According to 
Blumberg, ‘[t]his is one of the most unsatisfactory areas of the law’, ‘[w]ith hundreds of 
irreconcilable decisions and shifting rationales’, that functions ‘in an almost inscrutable manner 
behind conclusory metaphors such as “mere instrumentality”, “sham”, “adjunct”, “agent, “alter 
ego”, “puppet”, or dozens of similarly murky terms’.186  It is therefore not surprising that 
claimants in many cases of the Lubbe v Cape type attempt to avoid the piercing of the corporate 
veil and agency doctrines, and instead proceed on the basis of the parent company’s direct 
tortious liability.  Meeran, a partner in Leigh Day who was involved in many of the English 
cases described above, draws an interesting analogy between cases of this type and product 
liability cases: 
‘Save that one is dealing with “processes” rather than “products” an analogous duty to 
that owed by a manufacturer to consumers should be imposed (“process” liability).  
Indeed here it is arguable that the proximity of a [transnational corporation] to overseas 
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employees of its subsidiaries [and the people in its vicinity] is closer than that of a 
manufacturer to consumers of its products.’187 
Chandler188 is the first, and so far the only, English case where a parent was held directly liable 
towards the victims of its subsidiary’s operations. 
The question whether the issue of a parent company’s liability under the Chandler 
principles falls under the company law exclusion from the scope of Rome II is determined by 
autonomous interpretation.  Guidance can be found in the CJEU case law on the definition of 
the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ for the purposes of the Brussels jurisdictional 
regime.  It will be remembered that in Baten189 the CJEU held that it was necessary to examine 
the basis and the detailed rules governing the bringing of a claim to determine whether it 
concerned a civil or commercial matter. 
Much has been written about the nature of the Chandler type of liability in English law.  
Almost all scholars agree with Arden LJ that the case was in no way concerned with the 
piercing of the corporate veil.190  In essence, a duty of care was imposed on the parent company 
because control represented an assumption of responsibility, which, in turn, satisfied the 
requirements of proximity and justice demanded by the duty of care analysis in the English law 
of torts.  Chandler has been criticised for conflating the four elements of control, assumption 
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of responsibility, proximity and fairness into one ‘pragmatic’ inquiry into circumstances in 
which a duty of care might exist, and introducing a degree of uncertainty with regard to each 
of them.191  Nevertheless, one thing is clear.  Control was the key factor for imposing a duty of 
care.  The nature of the relevant control is therefore crucial for determining whether the 
Chandler type of liability concerns tort law or company law for the purposes of Rome II.  As 
Joseph explains, the control test in direct liability cases is different than in piercing cases: 
‘The issue is not control by the parent over the subsidiary.  Rather, the relevant control 
is that exercised by the parent over the conduct which gave rise to the tort at issue.  
Thus, the relevant “control test” focuses on the extent to which a parent is somehow in 
control of the causes of the tort, which will be linked to, but will not be the same as, the 
issue of a parent’s control over its subsidiary. 
Similarly, a parent corporation may attract direct liability if it undertakes to perform 
services for a subsidiary...  For example, employees of subsidiaries have successfully 
sued parent companies on the basis that the parent undertook but failed to provide a 
safe working place on behalf of the subsidiary.‘192 
Indeed, some of the relevant features of Chandler are that the parent had employed group 
medical and safety officers who had overseen the health and safety of employees across the 
group, that the contemporaneous documents, such as board minutes, showed that the parent 
had taken a direct interest in the working practices of the subsidiary that had employed the 
claimant, and that the parent and the subsidiary had shared directors who had been fully aware 
of what had been happening on the ground.193  Looking from this perspective, the Chandler 
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type of liability is a matter of tort law for the purposes of Rome II.  Consequently, the Chandler 
principles apply only if English law is the law governing the tort pursuant to the choice-of-law 
rules of Rome II. 
Chandler is at the borderline of tort law and company law, and it is not inconceivable 
that the CJEU might classify the relevant issue as one of company law for choice-of-law 
purposes.  Indeed, at least one scholar commenting on Chandler has adopted such a view.194  
Assuming that the relevant issue is classified as one of company law, would English law, 
including the Chandler principles, apply in a case of the Lubbe v Cape type brought in England 
against an English-based parent company?  Such a classification would take the relevant issue 
outside the scope of Rome II, and the law governing that issue would be determined pursuant 
to the traditional English choice-of-law rules.  The content of those rules, however, is 
unclear.195  The choice seems to lie between the law of the forum, the law governing the parent, 
the law governing the subsidiary, the law governing the tort or any of those that is most 
favourable to the claimant.  Scholarly opinions are divided.  According to the authors of Dicey, 
Morris & Collins, all matters concerning the constitution of a corporation are governed by the 
law of its place of incorporation.196  Similarly, Nygh favours the law governing the subsidiary 
on the basis that the relationship between a company and its shareholders should be determined 
by the law governing the company.197  Some are in favour of the law governing the tort, 
especially when the tort is committed in the forum.198  Lowenfeld proposes a unique solution 
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that favours the claimant:199 if the forum is where the parent is established and its law imposes 
a liability on it in respect of the actions of its foreign subsidiary, then that law should be applied; 
if, on the other hand, the law of the country of the injury imposes enterprise liability but the 
law of the parent does not, then the former law should be applied. 
In conclusion, it seems that the issue of whether a duty of care should be imposed on a 
parent company under the Chandler principles is to be classified as tortious for choice-of-law 
purposes, thus triggering the application of the choice-of-law rules of Rome II.  In the unlikely 
case that this issue is classified as pertaining to company law, the English traditional choice-
of-law rules will determine the governing law.  Although not free from doubt, it seems that the 
law applicable to this issue under the traditional rules would be the law of the subsidiary.  If 
so, English law, including the Chandler principles, would not apply in the Lubbe v Cape type 
of case brought in the English courts against an English-based parent company, but typically 
the law of a developing country.  This law will typically contain laxer environmental and 
compensation standards in comparison with the law of the parent company’s home country. 
 
(2) Choice of law in tort 
If the issue of whether a parent company is liable under the Chandler principles is classified as 
a tort law matter for the purposes of Rome II, the choice-of-law rules of that instrument will 
determine whether English law applies. 
In the Lubbe v Cape type of case, important decisions concerning the operations of the 
subsidiary are typically taken by the parent company in its home country.  Decisions vary from 
those concerning general issues of policy to those concerning day-to-day operations.  The 
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notorious Bhopal litigation200 represents one end of the scale, where the documents seem to 
have shown that the decision to shut off the refrigeration unit on the tank of methyl-isocyanate 
in Bhopal, India, which led to the warming up and explosion of the gas, was taken in the 
parent’s US headquarters, and communicated by letter to the management of the Indian 
subsidiary.  Typically, however, claimants allege that the parent’s superior knowledge of the 
health and safety issues and knowledge of the subsidiary’s unsafe system of work, coupled 
with its inaction, are the grounds for holding the parent liable.  According to Article 7 of Rome 
II, the law applicable to environmental damage is by the default the lex loci damni, but the 
victim can choose the lex loci actus.  In the Lubbe v Cape type of case, it is clear that the 
country of the damage is the country of the subsidiary.  The key question is therefore whether 
the decisions concerning the operations of the subsidiary taken by the parent in its home 
country that start the chain of events resulting in environmental damage are to be considered 
as the relevant event for the purposes of Article 7. 
Opinions are divided.  Some scholars argue that the decisions taken by the parent 
company constitute the relevant event,201 others that the relevant event is the tortious action of 
the subsidiary directly causing the environmental damage.202  To answer the question, one 
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should look closely at the choice-of-law rules of Rome II and at the case law on Article 7(2) of 
the Brussels I Recast.  Article 7 of Rome II states that the law applicable to environmental 
damage is ‘the law determined pursuant to Article 4(1)’, or, if the victim so chooses, the law 
of the country of the event giving rise to the damage.  According to Article 4(1), the applicable 
law for torts in general is the law of the country where the direct damage occurs regardless of 
where the indirect damage occurs.  The focus on the direct damage is said to be required by the 
principles of legal certainty and foreseeability and by the need to ‘ensure a fair balance between 
the interests of the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining the damage’.203  The 
parent company’s decisions in its home country that start the chain of events resulting in 
environmental damage can be regarded as an ‘indirect event’ in the sense that it precedes the 
subsidiary’s tortious action causing the damage directly.  Should the distinction between direct 
and indirect damage for the purposes of Article 4(1) be applied by analogy to the question of 
the nature of the event giving rise to the damage for the purposes of Article 7, this ‘indirect 
event’ would be disregarded for choice-of-law purposes. 
There are no CJEU cases directly on this point.  The case law on Article 4(1) of Rome 
II and Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Recast is potentially relevant.  It will be remembered that 
the CJEU cases dealing with the jurisdictional treatment of indirect damage and indirect victims 
demonstrate that only the place where the direct victim suffers direct damage is of jurisdictional 
relevance.204  The only CJEU case on the interpretation of Article 4(1) of Rome II, Florin Lazar 
v Allianz SpA,205 follows this line of cases and confirms that it is only the place where the direct 
victim suffers direct damage that is relevant for the purposes of Article 4(1) of Rome II.  Should 
this distinction be applied by analogy to the question of the nature of the event giving rise to 
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the damage for the purposes of Article 7 of Rome II, both the ‘indirect event’ (i.e. the parent 
company’s decisions in its home country that start the chain of events resulting in 
environmental damage) and the actions of the ‘indirect tortfeasor’ (i.e. the parent whose 
decisions concern the operations of the subsidiary) would be disregarded for choice-of-law 
purposes.  This logic seems to be supported by a recent CJEU decision in Melzer v MF Global 
UK Ltd.206  Here, a German private investor brought a tortious claim in Germany against an 
English broker trading in futures on the basis that he had been solicited as a client in Germany 
by a German company.  The defendant seems to have been sued both for its own alleged 
wrongdoing in England and for assisting the German company’s alleged wrongdoing in 
Germany.207  Furthermore, it seems to have been conceded that the only viable jurisdictional 
basis was with respect to the German company’s alleged wrongdoing in Germany, which the 
defendant had allegedly assisted.208  As Dickinson explains, this case ‘appears to be an attempt 
to turn the tort upside down – to treat a tort committed in London with facilitation from 
Germany, as one committed in Germany with facilitation from London’.209  The CJEU 
interpreted Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation, the predecessor of Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels I Recast, strictly and refused to allow the German courts to assume jurisdiction over 
the English co-perpetrator.  Similarly, in the Lubbe v Cape type of case victims attempt to treat 
a tort committed in a developing country with facilitation from a developed country as a tort 
committed in a developed country.  Should Melzer be applied by analogy to Article 7 of Rome 
II, this argument is bound to fail. 
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Two cases that are arguably to the point are the English High Court cases of Anton 
Durbeck GmbH v Den Norske Bank ASA210 and Vava v Anglo American South Africa Ltd.211  
In the first case the defendants were alleged to have unlawfully interfered with the claimant’s 
contracts for the carriage of goods by arresting the vessel in Panama.  The decision to arrest 
the vessel was taken by the defendant’s London branch.  According to the court: 
‘In one sense the decision of the branch of the Defendants in London can be said to 
have given rise to and to be the origin of the damage because the arrest is executed 
pursuant to that decision.  However, it can also be said that the arrest is the event which 
gives rise to the damage and is the origin of the damage because without the arrest there 
would be no interference with the contracts of carriage.’212 
The court held that the event giving rise to the damage for the purposes of Article 5(3) of the 
Brussels I Regulation occurred in Panama.  In Vava v Anglo American South Africa Ltd,213 the 
court was concerned with the question whether the defendant, a South African subsidiary of an 
English-based parent company, was domiciled in England for jurisdictional purposes.  The 
claimants argued that the defendant’s central administration was in England because the 
management entrepreneurial decisions relating to its business had been taken in England at the 
headquarters of the parent.  The court, however, held that a company’s central administration 
was not where such decisions were taken, regardless of whether they were taken by the 
company, its parent or anyone else.  An important reason was that accepting the claimants’ 
argument would mean that if such decisions were determined predominantly by the wishes of 
a bank or other institution on which it relied for its financial survival, then the defendant would 
have its central administration where the bank or institution took its decisions.  These two cases 
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show that the English courts interpret restrictively the relevant jurisdictional connecting factors 
in cases in which there are joint tortfeasors.  If these cases are applied by analogy to the choice-
of-law context in the Lubbe v Cape type of case, the tortious action of the subsidiary directly 
causing environmental damage will be considered as the relevant event for the purposes of 
Article 7 of Rome II. 
It is also important to look at the High Court decision in RTZ v Connelly214 and the 
second Court of Appeal decision in Lubbe v Cape.215  Wright J, when dealing with the case 
after the decision of the House of Lords in RTZ v Connelly,216 was clear that the cause of action 
had arisen in Namibia for the purposes of the common law choice-of-law rules.  It was not the 
making of decisions in England that was crucial, but the concrete results that this produced in 
Namibia.217  His Lordship also referred to a decision of the Court of Appeal to similar effect in 
Durham v T&N Plc.218  In Lubbe v Cape, the second Court of Appeal219 departed from the 
decision of the first Court of Appeal220 that, for the purposes of the common law choice-of-law 
rules, the breach of the parent’s duty of care had occurred in their boardroom in England and 
held that the obligations of the parent towards the employees of the subsidiary and the people 
in the vicinity were to be determined under South African law.  Although not made under Rome 
II, these decisions illustrate the likely answer to the question whether the decisions concerning 
the operations of the subsidiary taken by the parent in its home country are to be considered as 
the relevant event for the purposes of Article 7. 
Instead of framing their claims in terms of environmental damage, victims may claim 
for the alleged violation of their human rights.  Rome II does not have special choice-of-law 
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rules for human rights claims.  The general choice-of-law rules of Article 4 would apply and 
point to the application of the law of the country of the direct damage.  Since the direct damage 
in the Lubbe v Cape type of case occurs in the subsidiary’s country, the law of that country will 
govern.  It is highly unlikely that that law will be displaced in favour of the law of the parent 
company’s home country under the escape clause of Article 4(3). 
In conclusion, regardless of how a claim for environmental damage in the Lubbe v Cape 
type of case is framed, the applicable law is almost certain to be the law of the country of the 
subsidiary, typically a developing country.  This law will typically contain relatively lax 
environmental and compensation standards in comparison with the law of the parent 
company’s home country.  Consequently, even though victims of environmental damage are 
able to obtain the jurisdiction of the English courts over the parent established in that country, 
they will struggle to find lawyers willing to take on their case on a ‘no win no fee’ basis. 
 
Conclusion 
This article examines whether, and to what extent, the rules of European private international 
law, which frame international litigation in the Member State courts, contribute to the 
regulation of the environment.  Contrary to the majority opinion, this article argues that these 
rules fail in their pursuit of the cosmopolitan goals of EU environmental policy.  They are 
therefore an inadequate tool of global governance. 
After outlining the regulatory potential of private international law with regard to the 
protection of the environment, this article observes that international environmental litigation 
in EU courts is effectively confined to two types of case.  In the first type private claimants sue 
an operator whose actions in one country directly cause environmental damage elsewhere.  In 
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the second type of case the claim is brought by victims against a European-based corporation 
operating in an extraction or chemical industry whose overseas subsidiary, typically in a 
developing country, causes environmental damage.  Proceedings are commenced by private 
claimants only, arguably because European private international law excludes from its scope 
claims by public authorities against foreign operators.  Claims by public authorities, however, 
are crucial in cases of pure environmental damage where no individual suffers actionable 
personal injury, property damage or economic loss or where such harm is thinly spread among 
a number of victims, as recognised by the Environmental Liability Directive.  The second type 
of case is limited to extraction and chemical industries not just because of their characteristics 
and location but also because such industries tend to be run by hierarchical parent-subsidiary 
corporate groups.  Other industries tend to be run by corporate groups with more open and 
flexible forms of corporate organisation or business networks, where the chances of ascribing 
liability to the parent company/the controlling enterprise(s) are so low that arguably no lawyer 
will take on a case on a ‘no win no fee’ basis. 
The rules of European private international law also have the following regulatory 
effects.  By allowing the victim of environmental damage to choose both the forum and the 
applicable law between the courts/law of the country of the damage and the courts/law of the 
country of the event giving rise to the damage, the Brussels I Recast and Rome II address 
relatively adequately the first type of case.  But the cases of this type that are brought in EU 
courts will almost always concern actions committed in the EU and/or environmental damage 
suffered in the EU.  By guaranteeing the victim in this type of case the choice of the law of an 
EU Member State, Rome II helps to raise the level of environmental protection within the EU 
and at its borders.  Crucially, European private international law fails to deal with the globally 
more important and frequent cases of the second type.  The Brussels I Recast allows the 
claimants in this type of case to commence proceedings in the EU against a parent company 
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domiciled here, although it gives an amount of discretion to the Member State courts to stay 
their proceedings when parallel or related proceedings are already pending in a third country.  
The choice-of-law rules of Rome II, however, arguably lead to the application of the law of the 
country of the subsidiary, typically a developing country.  This law will typically contain laxer 
environmental and compensation standards in comparison with the law of the parent’s home 
country, which will make it hard for victims to obtain representation on a ‘no win no fee’ basis.  
Importantly, claimants in this type of case in the English courts will be unable to invoke the 
type of liability recently established in the English law of torts in Chandler v Cape.221  
European private international law therefore effectively shields European multinational 
corporations from liability for the environmentally detrimental and degrading effects of their 
overseas operations. 
For these reasons, the rules of European private international law overall fail in their 
pursuit of the cosmopolitan goals of EU environmental policy.  In fact, they often lead to 
outcomes that are contrary to the universally accepted environmental law principles on which 
EU environmental policy is based such as the principles that environmental damage should as 
a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter pays. 
It is worrying to see similar developments occurring elsewhere.  In April 2013, for 
example, the US Supreme Court effectively barred victims of gross violations of human rights 
and the environment outside the US by foreign corporations from bringing ATCA claims.  A 
year earlier UK Parliament passed a bill overhauling the system of conditional fees to the 
detriment of claimants in international environmental litigations.  Under the new rules, the 
claimants’ lawyers can recover from the losing defendant only ‘proportionate’ (as opposed to 
‘necessary’) legal costs and no success fees and litigation insurance premiums.222  Coupled 
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with the fact that, after the entry into force of Rome II, the assessment of damages is a matter 
for the law governing the tort,223 often the law of a developing country, it is likely that these 
developments will have a chilling effect on international environmental litigation in 
England.224  It should not be forgotten that the House of Lords in Lubbe v Cape225 and Connelly 
v RTZ226 regarded the shortcomings of the Namibian and South African legal systems which 
had a similar effect on international environmental and human rights litigation in these 
countries as leading to a denial of justice.  It is likely that the future of international 
environmental litigation in England will depend on the willingness and ability of non-
governmental environmental organisations to bring and sustain this type of litigation, as is the 
case now in the Netherlands and Sweden.227  The costs of such litigation, however, may turn 
out to be prohibitive. 
In order to achieve fully its regulatory potential, the rules of European private 
international should be improved.  The Brussels I Recast and Rome II should include within 
their scope claims by public authorities against foreign operators.  The rules of the Recast that 
allow the courts to stay their proceeding when parallel or related proceedings are already 
pending in a third country should be applied restrictively.  The victims of environmental 
damage in the second type of case should be allowed to choose the law of the country of the 
parent company.  Admittedly, there are scholars who believe that the rules of European private 
international are already along those lines.  After a detailed examination of these rules, 
                                                 
223 Rome II, Article 15(c). 
224 ‘Legal Aid Cuts will Stop Cases like Trafigura, UN Official Warns’, The Guardian, 16 June 2011. 
225 [2000] 1 WLR 1545. 
226 [1998] AC 854. 
227 In Bier [1976] ECR 1735, Akpan v Shell (2013) LJN BY9854 (the Netherlands) and Arica Victims KB v Boliden 
Mineral AB (2013) T. 1021–13 (Sweden), three NGOs, the Reinwater Foundation, Friends of the Earth 
Netherlands (Milieudefensie) and Arica Victims KB, respectively, played a key role in the proceedings.  
Transnational environmental cases have been brought in the Netherlands despite the following features of Dutch 
civil procedure: the ‘loser pays’ rule, the lack of a system of conditional or contingency fees, of legal aid for 
foreign claimants, of punitive damages, of class actions, restrictive rules on disclosure: Castermans and van der 
Weide, above, n 202, 61-69; Jägers and van der Heijden, above, n 201, 860-862; Ryngaert, above, n 65. 
69 
 
however, this article concludes that the restrictive, non-environmental-friendly interpretation 
is more likely.  It is for this reason that the Brussels I Recast and Rome II should be amended 
to expressly include within their scope claims by public authorities against foreign operators228 
and to expressly allow the victim to choose the law of the parent’s country.  On their own, 
however, these improvements will not be enough.  They should be complemented with 
adequate rules on the funding of international environmental litigation and liability of parent 
companies in corporate groups and dominant enterprise(s) in business networks for 
environmental damage caused by their subsidiaries, affiliates and cooperating enterprises.  At 
one point, it seemed that English law would move in this direction.  However, the proposed 
Corporate Responsibility Bill 2003 introduced in the House of Commons never made it through 
to the second reading.229  The time is ripe for these issues to be taken up by the EU legislator. 
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